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PART II

τὸ αὐτό, the same, can be understood in the sense of "identical." In current speech we constantly interchange the expressions "identical" and "the same." But "identical'" in Greek is ὄμοιον, not αὐτό. Indeed, how can thinking and being ever be identical? They are precisely what is different: presence of what is present, and taking-to-heart.

But it is just in their difference that they do belong together. Where and how? What is the element in which they belong together? Is it the νοεῖν, or the εἶναι, or neither? Is it, then, a third thing which in truth is the first for both—the first not as their synthesis, but still more primary and more originary than any thesis? learned: νοεῖν conceived in separation and by itself, that is, conceived without and apart from any relation to εἶναι, is simply not thinking at all. If confirmation were needed, Parmenides himself tells us so emphatically in the other passage, fragment 8, 34 ff.:


"οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος ... εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν"

"for not separately from the presence of what is present can you find out the taking-to-heart."


When Parmenides here says ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος rather than ἄνευ τοῦ εἶναι, he does so probably for substantive, not just stylistic reasons. The word ἄνευ means "without" in the sense of apart from; ἄνευ is the relation opposite to σύν, together. Ὀυ γὰρ ἄνευ—for not apart from . . . but rather only together with: the γάρ, for, refers to ταὐτόν, τὸ αὐτό, the same. Accordingly, what does the word τὸ αὐτό, the same, mean? It means what belongs together.


"τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι

"for the same: taking-to-heart is so also presence of what is present."


The two belong together in this way, that the essential nature of νοεῖν, named first, consists in its remaining focused


Martin Heidegger (GA 8) What Is Called Thinking?