form to whatever disposes of λέγειν and νοεῖν by directing drawing both to what they both refer to. And that is ἐὸν ἔμμεναι. Ἐὸν ἔμμεναι directs that which constitutes the fundamental character of thinking—the λέγειν and νοεῖν—into its nature. What so directs is what calls on us to think.
The effort to make an adequate translation of the final words of the saying, the attempt to hear what is expressed in the Greek words ἐὸν ἔμμεναι, is nothing less than the attempt to take to heart That which calls on us to think. To the extent to which make the effort to take it so to heart, are asking the question "What is called thinking?" in the decisive fourth sense:
What is That which calls on us to think, by so disposing the conjunction of λέγειν and νοεῖν that it relates to It?
Insofar as are capable of asking the question in the fourth, decisive sense, we also respond to the third way of asking is called thinking?" The third way is intent on arriving at what is needed, and thus required of us, if we are ever to accomplish thinking in an essentially fitting manner. No one knows what is called "thinking" in the sense of the third question until he is capable of λέγειν τε νοεῖν τε.
But as concerns thinking, we are living in the domain of a two-and-one-half-thousand year old tradition. Accordingly, must not imagine it to be enough for any man merely to inhabit the world of his own representational ideas, and to express only them. For the world of this expression is shot through with blindly adopted and un-reexamined ideas and concepts. could this confused manner of forming ideas be called thinking, however loudly it may claim to be creative? We are capable of thinking only if try first of all to develop the question "What is called thinking" in its fourfold sense, and in the light of the decisive fourth question:
A lecture course that ventures on such an undertaking