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PART II

human being, we must first give attention to the fact that man is that being who has his being by pointing to what is, and that particular beings manifest themselves as such by such pointing. Yet that which is, does not complete and exhaust itself in what is actual and factual at the given moment. To all that is—which is to say, to all that continues to be determined by Being—there belongs just as much, and perhaps even more, what can be, what must be, and what is in the past. is the being who is in that he points toward "Being," and who can be himself only as he always and everywhere refers himself to what is.

In a way it has never been possible to overlook altogether this characteristic of human nature. shall soon see where and how philosophy has found a place for this characteristic trait in human nature. However, it still makes a decisive difference whether this trait of the living being "man" is merely included in our considerations as a distinguishing mark superadded to the living being—or whether this relatedness to what is, because it is the basic characteristic of man's human nature, is given its decisive role as the standard. this is not done where the fundamental determinant of man's human nature is conceived as anima, nor where it is conceived as animus. Animus, it is true, means that inner striving of human nature which always is determined by, attuned to, what is. The Latin word animus can also be translated with the word "soul." "Soul" in this case means not the principle of life, but that in which the spirit has its being, the spirit of the spirit, Master Eckehart's "spark" of the soul. The soul in this sense is what Mörike speaks of in his poem "Think it, my soul." Among contemporary poets, Georg Trakl likes to use the word "soul" in an exalted sense. The third stanza of his poem "The Thunderstorm" begins :

"O pain, thou flaming vision
of the great soul!"


Martin Heidegger (GA 8) What Is Called Thinking?