But τέχνη also contains a tendency to liberate itself from handling things and to become an autonomous ἐπιστήμη. And insofar as this tendency resides in τέχνη, immediate natural Dasein credits it with being σοφώτερον.
On the other hand, τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν (Met. I, 1, 981b10), immediate and natural Dasein does not at all attribute to αἴσθησις the character of σοφία, καίτοι κυριώταταί γ᾽ εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα γνώσεις (b11), although αἴσθησις is the mode of ἀληθεύειν in which the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, the particular case, is accessible as such. Therefore, precisely in the field of πρᾶξις, where the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον is at issue, αἴσθησις is a κύριον over νοῦς and ὄρεξις. Indeed, Aristotle later (Nic. Eth. VI, 9, 1142a23ff.) even identifies αἴσθησις in a certain way with φρόνησις. Nevertheless, ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός (Met. I, 1, 981b11f.), the αἰσθήσεις do not provide the "why" of anything given and shown in them. Therefore natural Dasein does not attribute to the αἰσθήσεις the character of σοφία.
On the other hand, as has been said, there is in τέχνη itself a tendency to set itself free from handling things and to become an autonomous ἐπιστήμη. That this tendency resides in Dasein itself is evident for Aristotle in the fact that a τεχνίτης, he who, as we say, "dis-covers" something, is admired. τὸν ὁποιανοῦν εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων (b13ff.). "The τεχνίτης, he who, beyond what everyone sees, 'dis-covers' something, is admired," i.e., he is respected as one who distinguishes himself, who makes something that other people would not be capable of, yet precisely "not because what he invents might be very useful" but because he advances the grasp of beings, no matter whether what he discovers is great or small: i.e., because he is σοφώτερος. His discovering goes beyond the immediate possibilities in the power of Dasein. In this way, the admiration dispensed by everyday Dasein demonstrates that in Dasein itself there lives a special appreciation of dis-covery. Dasein is itself directed toward discovering beings and toward that by itself, μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν (b19f.), "apart from all usefulness," as Aristotle emphasizes. Thereby we can understand this, too, that the less τεχνάζειν and ἐπιστήμη are oriented πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα and πρὸς διαγωγήν (b18), toward the urgencies of life or toward amusements, the more Dasein addresses those who carry them out as σοφώτεροι.
The development of ἐπιστήμη now continues.1 As soon as the τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι were found which are required πρὸς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, for the necessities of life, and πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, for recreation and pleasure, Dasein could, unburdened by these necessities, dedicate itself wholly to contemplation.
1. Cf. Met. I, 1, 981b20ff.