This problem forms the basis of all those possibilities which are tried out over and over again and let loose on each other in endless discussions: the object is dependent on the subject, or the subject on the object, or both on each other in a correlative manner. This constructivistic forehaving, almost ineradicable on account of the pertinacity of a sedimented tradition, fundamentally and forever obstructs access to that which we have indicated with the term "factical life" ("Dasein"). No modification of this schema would be able to do away with its inappropriateness. The schema itself has developed historically within the tradition from different constructions of each of its components (subject and object) which proceeded in isolation from one another and were then integrated in various ways.
The disastrous infiltration of this schema into phenomenological research was already underscored in the description of the historical situation out of which phenomenology arose. The dominance of this epistemological problem (and corresponding ones in other disciplines) is characteristic of a widely observed kind of activity through which academic disciplines, especially philosophy, gain a foothold in life and preserve themselves. 90% of the literature is preoccupied with ensuring that such wrongheaded problems not disappear and are confounded still more and in ever new ways. Such literature dominates the industry—everyone sees and gauges the progress and vitality of academic disciplines with it.
Unnoticed in the midst of all this are those who quietly put a stranglehold on such pseudo-problems (Husserl's Logical Investigations!.) and see to it for those who have understood something of all this that they no longer investigate such things. Such negative influences are the most decisive ones and for just this reason impervious to all chatter in the public realm.
B. The prejudice of freedom from standpoints
Rejecting this way of proceeding in which the subject-object schema is foisted on fields of investigation is only one of the most urgent precautionary measures needed today. A second concerns a prejudice which merely constitutes the counterpart to the uncritical approach of generating constructions and theorizing. This is the demand for observation which is free of standpoints.
This second prejudice is even more disastrous for research because, with its express watchword for the seemingly highest idea of science and objectivity, it in fact elevates taking an uncritical approach into a first principle and promulgates a fundamental blindness. It cultivates a strange modesty and grants a general dispensation from critical questioning by means of the apparent self-evidence of what it demands. For what could be more obvious even to the slowest than the demand for an unbiased