62
"The Being-There of Dasein Is Being in a World" [80-81]

(a defining which works within the looking-toward and actualizes it in the sense of developing it) already in advance "have" what they wish to look into as such and such a being—what is had in advance in this manner and is found in each instance of accessing and dealing with the matter in question can be designated as a forehaving.

The fate of our approach to phenomena and our execution of concrete hermeneutical descriptions of them hangs on the level of the primordiality and genuineness of the forehaving into which Dasein as such (factical life) has been placed.

The forehaving in which Dasein (in each case our own Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time)[50] stands for this investigation can be expressed in a formal indication: the being-there of Dasein (factical life) is being in a world. This forehaving should already find its demonstration precisely in our analysis of curiosity. If such a demonstration is successful, then this still does not say anything about the primordiality of the forehaving—it is itself only a phenomenon of another forehaving which lies further back right within it and has already been at work in our descriptions.

The forehaving needs to be more closely examined and appropriated so that the empty intelligibility of the above formal indication can be filled out by looking in the direction of its concrete source in intuition. A formal indication is always misunderstood when it is treated as a fixed universal proposition and used to make deductions from and fantasized with in a constructivistic dialectical fashion. Everything depends upon our understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still intelligible content of the indication onto the right path of looking. Successfully getting onto this path can and must be aided by a precautionary measure which takes the form of rejecting certain positions of looking which are dominant in the situation of research at the particular time [jeweiligen Lage], which seem relevant, and which thus of themselves crowd in upon us.


§17. Misunderstandings


A. The subject-object schema


This schema must be avoided: What exists are subjects and objects, consciousness and being—being is the object of knowledge—being in the authentic sense is the being of nature—consciousness is an "I think," thus an ego, ego-pole, center of acts, person—egos (persons) have standing opposite them: beings, objects, natural things, things of value, goods. The relation between subject and object needs to be explained and is a problem for epistemology.


Martin Heidegger (GA 63) Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity