into the way-making movement), instead of trying to form a notion of language.
What looks like a confused tangle becomes untangled when we see it in the light of the way-making movement, and resolves into the release brought about by the way-making movement disclosed in Saying. That movement delivers Saying to speech. Saying keeps the way open along which speaking, as listening, catches &om Saying what is to be said, and raises what it thus has caught and received into the sounding word. The way-making of Saying into spoken language is the delivering bond that binds by appropriating.
Language, thus delivered into its own freedom, can be concerned solely with itself. This sounds as if we were talking of a selfish solipsism. But language does not insist upon itself alone in the sense of a purely self-seeking, all-oblivious self-admiration. As Saying, the nature of language is the appropriating showing which disregards precisely itself, in order to free that which is shown, to its authentic appearance.
Language, which speaks by saying, is concerned that our speaking, in listening to the unspoken, corresponds to what is said. Thus silence, too, which is often regarded as the source of speaking, is itself already a corresponding.* Silence corresponds to the soundless tolling of the stillness of appropriating-showing Saying. As Showing, Saying, which consists in Appropriation, is the most proper mode of Appropriating. Appropriation is by way of saying. Accordingly, language always speaks according to the mode in which the Appropriation as such reveals itself or withdraws. For a thinking that pursues the Appropriation can still only surmise it, and yet can experience it even now in the nature of modem technology, which we call by the still strange-sounding name of Framing (Ge-Stell**). Because Framing challenges man, that is, provokes him to order and act up all that is present being as technical inventory, Framing persists after the manner of Appropriation, .specifically by simultaneously obstructing
* See Being and Time, pp. 203-11. (M. H.)
** See Identity and Difference, pp. 14n. (M. H.)