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closing and, as ontic truth about beings, they are grounded i n the understanding-of-being, i.e., in what makes the disclosability of beings possible. That is, however, world-entry, and that means the happening of a being-in-the-world. Understanding-of-being is transcendence; all understanding-of-being, whether unthematically pre-ontological, or thematic and conceptually ontological, is transcendental. This understanding-of-being and its essential basic modes is the disclosure that resides in the ecstatic unity of temporality, in the temporalizing breaking-open of horizons. This disclosure is the metaphysically primordial being-true, the truth, which is transcendence itself, veritas transcendentalis. It is the condition for the possibility of every ontic-intentional truth.
With the happening of transcendence, of transcendental truth, beings are already discovered as well, though we see, from the essence of truth as such and the metaphysical beginning of the happening of transcendence, that beings are, in the first instance and at length, concealed and that truth must be called unconcealedness with reference to this primary concealedness. Beings are generally concealed, as long as no world-entry happens as such. There is accordingly a deep insight in the Greek word for truth, ἀ-λήθεια. Beings must first of all be torn from concealment; concealment must be removed from beings, and it gets removed inasmuch as temporalizing temporality provides the occasion for world-entry. It can be shown everywhere in pre-Socratic philosophy and in Plato and Aristotle that this interpretation of the peculiarly privative, negative character of the Greek conception of truth is not etymological trifling. Let one statement of Heraclitus serve as reference, (Fragment 123): φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, the being in itself and its essence loves to conceal itself and to remain in concealment.
Truth resides in the essence of transcendence; it is primordially transcendental truth. But if the basic theme of logic is truth, then logic itself is metaphysics if the problem of transcendence presents in another way the fundamental theme of metaphysics, as I have tried to show.
Only one thing is correct in the traditional and nowadays usual emphasis on the form of judgment as the center of logic, and that is that truth is shifted to the center. But then there must be a radical inquiry into the essence of truth. Metaphysics should not be transported into logic, or the converse. The point is not a division into disciplines, but the disciplines, moreover, are themselves the problem.
Now we saw that traditional logic is the science of propositions, of thinking, and its main purpose is to define the laws of thought