differ as basic possibilities of the free encounter of the metaphysical essence of Dasein with its world, which is, in itself, one and the same.
Only because, in our factical intentional comportment toward beings of every sort, we, outstripping in advance, return to and arrive at beings from possibilities, only for this reason can we let beings themselves be what and how they are. And the converse is true. Because, as factically existing, transcending already, in each case, encounters beings, and because, with transcendence and world-entry, the powerlessness, understood metaphysically, is manife st, for this reason Dasein, which can be powerless (metaphysically) only as free, must hold itself to the condition of the possibility of its powerlessness, to the freedom to ground. And it is for this reason that we essentially place every being, as being, into question regarding its ground.
We inquire into the why in our comportment toward beings of every sort, because in ourselves possibility is higher than actuality, because with Dasein itself this being-higher becomes existent. This being-higher of the possible, vis-à-vis the actual, is only existent when temporality temporalizes itself. If one, however, sees in the temporalization of temporality the being of what is more being than other beings, then it is true that πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν (Aristotle, Metaphysics θ 8, 1049 b 5): "Actuality is prior to possibility"—namely, precisely because possibility is higher than actuality.
In its metaphysical essence, Dasein is the inquirer into the why. The human being is not primarily the nay-sayer (as Scheler said in one of his last writings), but just as little is the human being a yea-sayer. The human is rather the why-questioner. But only because man is in this way, can he and must he, in each case, say, not only yes or no, but essentially yes and no. In traditional academic logic the seemingly innocuous banalities found under the terms "positive and negative judgment" ultimately move in this dimension.
§ 14. The Essence of ground and the idea of logic
Logic is, we said at the beginning of these lectures, knowledge of the λόγος, the statement. Its basic characteristic is truth. It emerged further that the truth of statements is founded primarily on comportments which do not have the character of statements, such as intuiting and the like. The latter have the character of disclosing