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and factual being, its surpassive character, can also be seen particularly in despair, where one's own lack of freedom engulfs a Dasein absorbed in itself. This completely facti cal lack of freedom is itself an elemental testimony to transcendence, for despair lies in the despairing person's vision of the impossibility of something possible. Such a person still witnesses to the possible, inasmuch as he despairs of it.
The surpassing of factic beings that is peculiar to the world as such, and thereby to transcendence and freedom corresponds to the epekeina [beyond]. In other words, the world itself is surpassive; beings of Dasein's character are distinguished by upswing or élan [Uberschwung]; world is the free surpassive counter-hold of the for-the-sake-of.
Only insofar as Dasein in its metaphysical essence, freely presenting its own for-the-sake-of, overshoots itself, does Dasein become, as upswing toward the possible, the occasion (from a metaphysical viewpoint) for beings to emerge as beings. Beings of Dasein's nature must have opened themselves as freedom, i.e., world must be held out in the upswing, a being must be constituted as being-in-the-world, as transcending, if that being itself and beings in general are to become apparent as such. Thus Dasein, seen metaphysically as this being-in-the-world, is therefore, as factically existent, nothing other than the existent possibility for beings to gain entry to world. When, in the universe of beings, a being attains more being [seiender] in the existence of Dasein, i.e., when temporality temporalizes [Zeitlichkeit sich zeitigt], only then do beings have the opportunity to enter the world. Entry into world, furthermore, provides the possibility for beings to be able to be revealed.
Before proceeding to clarify transcendence in its intrinsic possibility, so as to see then the rootedness of the essence of ground in transcendence, we must first make transcendence more intelligible by briefly characterizing the entry into world.
So far as we have succeeded in clarifying transcendence, one thing must be clear. The world does not mean beings, neither individual objects nor the totality of objects standing opposite a subject. Whenever one wishes to express transcendence as a subject-object relation, especially as in the movement of philosophical realism, the claim is frequently made that the subject always already presupposes the "world" and, by this, one means objects that are. We maintain that this claim is far from even seeing the real phenomenon of transcendence and even further from saying anything about it.
What is it supposed to mean that the subject "presupposes" objects