close to the borders of solipsism? Certainly not a solipsism of consciousness, but nonetheless we are confronted with the proposition: without "me," there is nothing. Out of instinctive caution, of course, he here uses such phrases as "cannot be understood" and "cannot be said." But for Heidegger, to every mode of being there belongs, as by essential law, a determined kind of understanding, and understanding itself, in all its modes in the being of Dasein, grounds not only readiness-to-hand but also presence-at-hand-and being real. Of course he also says, "But the fact that reality is ontologically grounded in the being of Dasein does not signify that only when and as long as Dasein exists can the real be as what it is" (SZ, 211f.). But doesn't that contradict the sentences we just cited? Or does he mean to say that the removal of Dasein does not affect that which is in itself, but only its being-real? Or that the real, i.e., real things, are not affected, but that the kind of being of being-real is? According to what I teach, the reversal of the first interpretation holds true. Being-real, and therefore the reality of things, are not affected by cancelling the solus ipse- nor is the essence of man at all affected- but precisely for this reason: because there is also a supra-singular (but not supra-individual) "Dasein" which by way of vital urge posits in its fortuitous thusness in itself, everything which is "given" to me as resistance in my striving endeavors and which, as supra-singular (but concretely individual) spirit, encloses in an indivisible act within the limits of (its] essence that which I, in and with the supra-singular Dasein, can ideate. But Heidegger doesn't want to travel this road any more than Hartmann does. But is there really any other way than mine if one rejects the critical realism of Hartmann and the impossible "theory of images" (cf. the previous) and if, on the other hand, one wants to avoid the solipsism of Heidegger?

The restriction of being-real to "inner-worldly entities" mixes the true and the false. The true consists in the fact that (1) the being of the ens a se is obviously not being-real, neither as a bare ens a se nor as spirit and vital urge; spirit originally has its essence only as being-in-act [Akt-Wesensein], whereas vital urge is a becoming which strives towards realization; and that (2) both the person as a spiritual individual act-center and !if e in man -here Heidegger is right-have no "reality," because to both of them there belongs: (a) being-in-act, which means non-objectifiable being; (b) becoming ( all reality, inclusive of [266] something in process of becoming real, is completed being); and (c) non-determinedness by everything which is not itself person and life (in persons this is "freedom,'' in living beings it is "spontaneity"). But as correct as it is to restrict the categories of being-real to objectifiable being, to being-as-completcd (natura naturata, history which has happened, life which has become) and to being which is clearly determined from without, it is equally inadmissible that being-real presupposes the disclosure of the world. The world itself is becoming-real from moment to moment, but it is not a presupposition of

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