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Part II

based deduction of the categories. [397] But we need to say more. The schematism-synthesis is the presupposition for the ur-temporal deduction of the categories, a presupposition which Kant obviously clarified only much later and which he never understood radically as a presupposition. Further, we have to emphasize what Curtius did not adequately valorize: that for Kant subsumption and synthesis in general are equally essential, in keeping with the theory of judgment and concept that Kant took over from the tradition.145

However, that belongs in a thematic interpretation of Kant. We are asking about the phenomenon of time itself and, after that, about how time is understood in the doctrine of the schematism. We now ask: By what right did we say at the beginning of our interpretation of Kant’s conception of time, that he held fast—indeed, in principle—to the traditional concept of time (viz., time as now-time), and that he nonetheless pushed out beyond it toward a philosophical understanding of time, thereby touching a boundary but never getting beyond it into the open?


§35. The time-determination of the synthesis speciosa

We must keep in mind this fundamental fact: Even in a very advanced philosophical understanding of time, time is always understood in terms of the now. Therefore the following consideration, which is meant to lead us into the dimension of ur-temporality, must remain oriented to the phenomenon of the now.

1. In the previous determinations of time (production of time, time-filling, and ever-prior time-filling), time and therefore the now are not thematically comprehended. Therefore, they also are not determined in some way like being counted up and measured in answer to the question, “How much time has gone by?” Therefore, here time is not the time of the appearances. Rather, it is time in relation to the I-think itself—the spontaneous synthesis of the imagination.146 For the first time in philosophy, time is taken in its transcendental function within the a priori constitution of the whole of transcendental [398] truth, i.e., of that which positively determines the possibility of appearance.


145. [Moser (p. 793.29–794.5) records Heidegger adding: “Insofar as, for Kant, the idea of subsumption is tightly [eng] connected with the idea of synthesis, in keeping with his theory of judgment, we cannot easily set the two schematisms over against each other, despite the poor shape Kant left them in. Rather, we have to try to point out the inner connection between the two.”]

146. [This last phrase is from Moser, p. 794.32–795.1.]


Martin Heidegger (GA 21) Logic : the question of truth

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