one that, qua relating, also has a pres-ential character. But an act of relating is pres-ential not insofar as it is merely present the way a mental event is, of which (it is commonly held) I am immediately aware. Likewise it is not presentative insofar as the presentative character of an act of relating is basically no different from the presentative character of a thing. Rather, the act of relating to something must have its presentative character as an act of relating. An act of relating, taken as such, is presentative insofar it means “rendering present” or, as we say in German, Gegenwärtigen: “making-something-present.” By makingpresent, the act of relating lets a present thing encounter us.

Corresponding to the act of making-present or rendering present there is the presence of the thing that underlies and fulfills the making-present, the thing that gets uncovered and disclosed in the very act of making-present. In the case of deception, as we have said, the supporting structure and primary condition of the deception is the act of constantly letting the already-given encounter me. This constant letting-something-encounter-me is nothing but the simple and direct making-present of something in its immediate presence, specifically something that is already there prior to its representation. This act of making-present in which I constantly live—and making-present specifically in the mode of awaiting—offers the possibility that something can encounter me; that is, it offers the possibility that a present being is uncovered and can be present.

“Making-present” means the very same as “letting a present being encounter us in a now-moment [Gegenwart].” What gets disclosed in the act of making-present is thereby understood as something we encounter in a now-moment, something that, in this now-moment, can appear in its presence. But the presence of the thing we encounter need not be already and completely present-now, that is, it need not be completely uncovered. The only thing that is completely present is something that we encounter in an act of pure making-present, therefore something that, in itself and in its presence, can offer nothing except that as which it is present. Pure making-present or presenting is of such a nature that, [193] in it there is nothing about the thing-tobe-uncovered that is not now-present. The thing to be uncovered is brought into pure, direct nearness. In other words, the pure uncoveredness of beings—as Aristotle understood it with regard to simple beings—means nothing other than the pure unchanged and unchangeable presence-now [Gegenwart] of what is present. Uncoveredness—in this case, pure presence-now—is as such the highest mode of presence. But presence is the fundamental determination of being. Therefore, uncoveredness—which, as presence-now, is the highest mode of presence—is a mode of being: it is present presence [anwesende Anwesenheit] itself.