now than it was then. Philosophy saw the opposition of ideal to real being as the only essential thing, so much so that, when the second volume [of the Logical Investigations] was published right after the first volume—which had four times the pages and positive content of the first volume, and which contained the phenomenology—some said that in the second volume Husserl was still continuing to do psychology. Or, as Sigwart says at the end of the introduction to the third edition [of his Logik] in 1904: “Husserl may be battling against psychologism, but he is guilty of the very same heresy.” So, we will be able to take a position on Husserl’s critique of psychologism only when we have understood this critique in its proper sense. [89]
§10. Anti-critical questions. The need to take the question of the essence of truth back to Aristotle
We now pose three questions:
a) What is the core of the critique of psychologism, and why must the critique of psychologism be a critique of psychology?
b) What positive element does this critique of psychologism offer with regard to the guiding question about understanding and interpret-ing the phenomenon of truth?
c) What is the connection between this interpretation of truth (= b) and the one we distinguished in the first place, that of propositional truth (validity)? And do the two formulations satisfy the demand for a radical exposition and interpretation of the phenomenon?
a) Why must the critique of psychologism be a critique of psychology?
The separation of the real mental being of thinking and the ideal content of what is thought is so obvious that you might think that you only have to maintain this separation firmly and consistently in order (a) to thwart any complicating influence from psychology (which deals with the real mental), and (b) to have a univocal, delimited arena for logic. The logic of validity, and especially Rickert’s concept of psychology, is of this opinion. It is most clearly seen in Rickert’s concept of psychology, which sees psychology as quite analogous to mechanics. Psychology deals with real being and therefore is a pure natural science. On the other hand, logic deals with the ideal being of validity (Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlich Begriffsbildung).69
69.[The reference is to Heinrich Rickert, Die Grenze der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften (Tübingen: