tasks. The primary given is the world and not things, the primary presence is meaning and not objects. The inconspicuous non-objective presence of worldliness in its correlative concernedness takes primacy over the overt bodily presence correlative to perceivedness. World can never be reached by intuition but only by way of understanding and its interpretation, here, by way of the concerned preoccupation by which we get around that world. The basic mode of knowing here is no longer intuition but instead interpretive exposition out of this prior meaningful whole (GA Bd. 20, 359; 260). 'The way of access is the concerned preoccupation of" getting around" and not a free-floating and isolated perception of a thing. The view that reality can be found in bodily presence and this in turn in the isolated thing of nature will even more strikingly prove to be a phenomenal and therefore a phenomenological deception' (GA Bd. 20, 257; 190). In the context of the environing world, 'what is truly given immediately is not what is perceived but what is present in concerned preoccupation, the handy within the scope of our reach and grasp. Such a presence of the environmental, which we call handiness, is a founded presence.' For more original than handiness is worldliness in its 'pale and inconspicuous presence,' in which the presence of the handy is accordingly grounded, founded. 'But if this handily nearest, the handy in concern, is already a founded presence, then this applies even more so to the character of reality that we learned about earlier and that Husserl claims to be the authentic presence of the world, what he calls bodiliness' (GA Bd. 20, 264; 194f). Bodily presence is 'in no way a primary character but rather is grounded in handiness and what is immediately available within concern.' Bodily presence is the kind of encounter with world-things that occurs in pure perception, but this can occur only when our getting around the world 'is denied its full possibility of encounter.' It occurs only when the 'primarily given and experienced world,' which is in fact our primary encounter, 'is in some manner blocked' (GA Bd. 20, 265; 195). It occurs when the looking around that accompanies our getting around the world is interrupted or, noematically, when the referential relations that reveal the environmental thing in its very handiness are breached, as in the experience of the broken hammer, such that it is now merely viewed. Looking around thus becomes looking at, circumspection is modified to inspection, the world-thing 'decays' into a mere thing, its unemphatic worldly presence becomes an obtrusive, 'naked' (bloßen: GA Bd. 20, 266; 196) bodily presence. All this occurs simply by covering up or 'masking' the network of relations that constitute the world-thing precisely as worldly.
On the level of understanding, accordingly, the unemphatic, inconspicuous, non-objective presence of the world becomes the primary presence out of which all other levels of presence derive. In SS 1925, following Husserl, Heidegger calls this primary tacit presence 'appresence.' It is only in Being and Time that he gives it the fuller, richer and 'thicker' name of 'present