78 | Truth and Being

We are seeking to determine the manner of being of Dasein, as distinct from that of what is present at hand, by orienting ourselves toward the being with one another of Dasein and Dasein. Being with one another proved to be a sharing in the unconcealment (truth) of what is present at hand (one possible way of being with one another and/or necessarily belonging to it), as a manner of being. Truth is accordingly constitutive for the structure of being with one another as an essential manner of being of Dasein.

b) The unconcealment of what is present at hand

Truth (unconcealment) accordingly belongs to Dasein itself, to what this being is and to how it is, how it exists. How does truth (unconcealment) belong to the Dasein that we ourselves are? If we now seek to answer this question, then let us recall that we previously already attributed truth qua unconcealment to that which is present at hand, for we said, after all: the being itself is primarily true and not the statement about it. Unconcealment accordingly “belongs” to what is present at hand, and now it is supposed to belong to Dasein, as constitutive for the being with one another of Dasein. Does it accordingly “belong” both to what is present at hand and to Dasein, or does it indeed lie as it were “between” what is present at hand and Dasein? How does unconcealment belong to the thing that is present at hand—does it belong to it at all? And what does “belong” mean here?

We saw, after all, that the unconcealment of the chalk is not something that would be present at hand in it; we cannot ascertain unconcealment as something present at hand in the chalk, move it back and forth with the chalk, for instance, or wear it down by writing. Indeed, on the basis of the chalk’s unconcealment, we apprehend precisely the fact that this being does not first become what and how it is by its being unconcealed for us, and correlatively, neither does it cease being what it is and in the way that it is by its being concealed from us.

If we are to state what a piece of chalk is in general, then it is quite certain that unconcealment will not appear in this definition. Chalk is not necessarily unconcealed; its essence also admits of its being concealed; unconcealment is not an essential determination of chalk as chalk nor of the sponge as sponge. Yet perhaps unconcealment is an essential determination of what is present at hand insofar as it is present at hand?

However, if we consider a rock somewhere in a ravine that no human has ever set foot in, then surely this being can be present at hand as what and how it is without ever having to be torn from concealment, without ever being unconcealed, indeed while being altogether unaffected by concealment and unconcealment. Perhaps it is necessary within certain limits that what is present at hand be unconcealed in order to apprehend its manner of being, but it surely does not follow from this that what is factically present at hand necessarily be manifest in its what and how. Unconcealment is not an essential determination of what is


Introduction to Philosophy (GA 27) by Martin Heidegger