encounter of the world, b) the interpretation of the structure of encounter, that is, the exposition of the phenomenal correlation founding these characters of encounter, and c) the determination of the basic structure of world hood as deployment totality.*
These steps serve to clarify four questions about the tradition: 1) why the authentic structure of the being of the world, [what we have called] primary worldhood, was from the start and has ever since been passed over in philosophy; 2) why this structure of being, even when a replacement phenomenon equipped with value predicates is brought in for it, is still held to be in need of explanation and derivation; 3) why it is explained by being clarified and founded in a fundamental stratum of reality; 4) why this founding reality is conceived as the being of nature and that in terms of the objectivity of mathematical physics.
In taking these three steps, we shall try to get close to the peculiar presence [Präsenz] of the world around us. We must keep to it from the beginning, since the understanding of the analysis is possible only by placing ourselves in the specific natural kind of preoccupation with the world in which we constantly move. We do not actually have to make this displacement but need only to make explicit the kind of comportment in which we constantly move everyday, and which, for the reasons stated, is at first the least visible of all.
The question is how the world shows itself in everyday concern. This entity, world, presents itself [präsentiert sich] in the character of 'serving to,' 'conducive to' or 'detrimental to,' 'relevant to,' and the like. The worldly is encountered as itself always in and as a reference to another. 'Reference' henceforth is used as a technical term.
The other element which as it were gets forced into co-presence in such reference (serviceability, conduciveness, and the like) is that to which—for which the conducive is what it is. These referential relations are such that in them a manifold of environmental things shows itself, for example, a public square with its surroundings, a room with its furnishings. The manifold of things encountered here is not an arbitrary manifold of incidental things; it is first and only present [gegenwärtig] in a particular correlation of references. This referential contexture
* Bewandtnisganzheit, which replaces Bedeutsamkeit, a change postdating the lecture course, as is indicated by the original title of this subsection §23c as it stands on page 200 below. Cf. "On the Way to Being and Time" on the late introduction of Bewandtnis into this lecture course.
History of the Concept of Time
GA 20 p. 251