own λόγος) authentically and essentially, and therefore constantly—namely, the Λόγος as being—precisely this would presence toward the human and its dispersal onto its selfish paths, but at the same time would be absent and remote and therefore foreign. But perhaps we are here developing arbitrary trains of thought of which Heraclitus himself was not aware. Where in the cited fragment is there mention of presencing, absence and presence, or of the relationship between presencing and absencing, or of the difference between presencing and presentness (which are usually one and the same for us)? It is indeed the case that nothing concerning this is to be found, at least not in the text. But perhaps what ‘stands written’ in such a text by such a thinker is always what is present and not what presences. Perhaps a thinker also thinks more than what he knows, thinks he knows, and speaks about. Perhaps this ‘more’ is what brings the thinker to think and what first thinks him. Perhaps we must concede to a thinker that this is indeed the case, if we at all and in advance are to take him seriously as a thinker.


REVIEW

1) The λόγος of the ψυχή as the gathering toward the originary, all-preserving gathering. The erroneousness of psychological views. Fragments 45 and 50. References to fragments 101 and 116

This lecture on ‘logic’ dwells upon an interpretation of what Heraclitus says about the Λόγος, In this way, we are thinking the essence of λόγος in a more originary way. We are thereby following a more [308] originary ‘logic.’ We are thereby also learning to think in a more originary way. Perhaps in taking this path we will succeed in taking one step in our thinking, though even this one step may still be rather clumsy. Compared to the deluge of results and information that the sciences pour out on a daily basis, what our attempt at thinking accomplishes seems pitiful. It appears as though we are not moving about within any clearly defined domain. And not only does it appear this way—it is indeed the case. The thinking being undertaken here is without a domain. Nevertheless, it moves toward one single place. It appears as though this thinking is of no immediate use to us. And not only does it appear this way—it is indeed the case. This thinking is useless and, in that sense, it is unnecessary. Nevertheless, the unnecessary is the most necessary: it is fulfilled through the essential need and necessity of the human essence, and is thereby unavoidable. In the event that this domain-less and useless thinking now and then brushes against


The absent presence of the Λόγος    231

Heraclitus (GA 55) by Martin Heidegger