that the Greek word for falsehood (ψεῦδoς) and the Greek word for truth (ἀλήθεια) have completely different origins. Ψεῦδoς, Heidegger proceeds to argue, does not simply mean “concealment” (Verborgenheit) but rather “distortion” (Verdrehung) (136; or Verstellen), that is, not simply concealing a thing, but presenting it in such a way as to misrepresent it. But then which of the two different phenomena expressed by ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδoς, that is, unconcealment and distortion, comes to define the other? Heidegger clearly states his answer and his overriding thesis in the following passage, which, on account of its importance, merits being cited at length:
In the first place let us firmly maintain this: with the emergence of ψεῦδoς (distortion [die Verdrehung]) as the opposite [Gegenbegriff] of ἀλήθεια, ἀλήθεια as unconcealing [Entbergen] takes the orientation for its meaning from ψεύδεσθαι and comes to mean the same as ἀ-ψευδεῖν, transforms itself into the opposite of distorting [Verdrehen] (not-distorting). Through this noteworthy juxtaposition, ἀληθεύειν loses its fundamental meaning [Grundbedeutung] and becomes uprooted from the fundamental experience itself [Grunderfahrung selbst] out of which unconcealment [die Unverborgenheit] was understood. In this way ἀλήθεια moves into an opposition to the kind of concealing [Verbergen] that is a covering-up [Verdecken] and distorting [Verstellen], and not simply to concealment [Verborgenheit] and concealing [Verbergung] as such, but rather to distortion [Verdrehung], which perhaps has within itself the moment of concealment [Verborgenheit], but without this moment emerging [welches aber nicht herauskommt]. This covering-up [Verdecken] (distorting [Verdrehen]) is thereby initially in a position of combating [Abwehrstellung gegen] uncovering [das Aufdecken] (making-unconcealed); “uncovering” thus receives the meaning of not-distorting [nicht-verstellen], not-hiding [nicht-verstecken], hitting upon [treffen],—which is something other than what came before: simply and for the first time tearing what is concealed [Verborgenes] out of its concealment [der Verborgenheit]. (138)
But that truth is opposed only to distorting and thus comes to be identified only with “hitting upon” and “getting right” is precisely what Heidegger’s reading of the Theaetetus fails to show. This is why at the end of the course he can return to the thesis stated on page 138 only by means of dogmatic assertions no longer based on a careful reading of the text. Ψεῦδoς in the dialogue of course does not mean only “concealment,” since something can be concealed without being untrue. But ψεῦδoς does preserve its sense of “semblance” and therefore its connection to concealment, so that it does not demand as its opposite a conception of truth as mere “getting right.”