This verse is itself εὔκυκλος, abundant and overflowing; it says on its own the complete tautology.
But a question is posed: Where and how does presence itself presence?
Answer: It presences in unconcealment. Thus, the non-trembling heart of ἀλήθεια is τὸ ἐόν itself!
Even this is also said by Parmenides. He actually names τὸ ἐόν, in verse 4 of fragment 8, ἀτρεμὲς.
The ἀλήθεια is no empty opening, no motionless chasm. One must think it as the disclosure which fittingly encircles the ἐόν, that is, the presencing: presencing itself.
Having thus answered the initial question, have we not a s well arrived at the indemonstrable? Certainly. We must even assume that this is the only possible access both to the ἐόν and to ἀλήθεια. In any case, this is what Parmenides says, in fragment 1, verse 28:
“It is necessary that you experience all things.”
Parmenides says here πυθέσθαι. It is not an ordinary experience, but authentic experience, the one spoken of in verse 1 of fragment 6:
“Saying (the letting-show-itself) and perceiving (what is accomplished with this) are necessary”—
Χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν
This experience, and what it safeguards, is precisely what is said at the end of the same verse:
ἐόν ἔμμεναι—presencing presencing [Anwesend Anwesen].
This thought of Parmenides is neither judgment nor proof, nor a grounded explanation. It is rather a self-grounding upon what has let itself be seen.
As Goethe indicates, what is perhaps most difficult is to attain an unprejudiced observation. With Parmenides, this difficulty is precisely the issue: to hold in view presencing: presencing.
This itself, presencing-presencing, thoroughly attunes the fitting encircling unconcealment that discloses it.
Here ends the reading.
Heidegger continues: I name the thinking here in question tautological thinking. It is the primordial sense of phenomenology. Further, this kind of thinking is before any possible distinction between theory and praxis. To understand this, we need to learn to distinguish between path and method. In philosophy, there are only paths; in the sciences, on the contrary, there are only methods, that is, modes of procedure.
Thus understood, phenomenology is a path that leads away to come before..., and it lets that before which it is led show itself. This phenomenology is a phenomenology of the inapparent. Only now can one understand that there were no concepts for the Greeks. Indeed, in con-ceiving