THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ΨΕΥΔΗΣ ΔΟΞΑ
Where do we stand at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation? It emerged that the guiding perspectives do not suffice, for they always lead to the assertion of the impossibility of anything like distorted view, i.e. to the essential impossibility of the phenomenon. Yet this phenomenon undeniably exists! We find ourselves confronted by the phenomenon of distorted view, and yet we nevertheless maintain the inner impossibility of the same. What must give way?
Our thesis of the impossibility of the phenomenon must give way to the fact that there is such a thing. This means that the guiding perspectives of the three attempts were inadequately grounded and also that the phenomenal state of affairs was for its part inadequately comprehended. A fact as such does not immediately have the priority of an essential insight, already for the reason that 'pure facts' do not exist for us at all. Every fact is already understood as this and this, i.e. it stands under the knowledge of essence. Where the knowledge of essence is grounded, then in respect of facts Hegel's statement holds: 'all the worse for the facts'. In our case the thesis must give way - not simply to give priority to the fact, but in order that we can ask after it in an unhindered manner. If we do not want to close our eyes, we must save the phenomenon, despite, indeed even because of, its 'miraculous' character. If the phenomenon itself has the first say, its clarification requires that the previous guiding perspectives be retracted.
This retraction is admittedly only a negative step. We do not in this way arrive at those positive perspectives which allow the phenomenon itself to come forth. Or do we need no perspectives at all? Can we see the phenomenon directly, purely and simply for itself? No! From the interpretation of the cave allegory, and likewise from the discussion of αἴσθησις, we have learnt to understand that we always perceive what surrounds us in the light of, in regard to, an ἰδέα.
It was an error of phenomenology to believe that phenomena could be