The Essence of Human Freedom
CONTENTS
xii
Translator's Foreword
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1
§ 1. The Apparent Contradiction between the 'Particular' Question
Concerning the Essence of Human Freedom and the 'General' Task of an
Introduction to Philosophy
2
a) The 'Particularity' of the Topic and the 'Generality' of an
Introduction to Philosophy
4
b) Broadening the Question Concerning the Essence of
Human Freedom towards the Totality of Beings (World
and God) in the Preliminary Discussion of 'Negative'
Freedom. Specific Character of Philosophical as Distinct
from Scientific Questioning
7
c) Deeper Interpretation of 'Negative Freedom' as
Freedom-from ... in Terms of the Essence of Its
Relational Character. Beings in the Whole Necessarily
Included in the Question Concerning Human Freedom
9
d) Philosophy as Revealing the Whole by Means of
Properly Conceived Particular Problems
PART ONE
POSITIVE DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY
FROM THE CONTENT OF THE PROBLEM
OF FREEDOM
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN FREEDOM
AND THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF
PHILOSOPHY
13
Chapter One
First Breakthrough to the Proper Dimension of the Problem of
Freedom in Kant. The Connection of the Problem of Freedom
with the Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics
13
§ 2. Philosophy as Inquiring into the Whole.
Going-after-the-Whole as Going-to-the-Roots
15
§ 3. Formal-Indicative Discussion of 'Positive Freedom' by
Reconsideration of Transcendental' and 'Practical'
Freedom in Kant
19
§ 4. Broadening of the Problem of Freedom within the
Perspective of the Cosmological Problem as Indicated in the
Grounding Character of Transcendental Freedom':
Freedom - Causality - Movement - Beings as Such
23
§ 5. The Questionable Challenging Character of the Broadened
Problem of Freedom and the Traditional Form of the
Leading Question of Philosophy. Necessity of a Renewed
Interrogation of the Leading Question
28
Chapter Two
The Leading Question of Philosophy and Its Questionability.
Discussion of the Leading Question from Its Own Possibilities
and Presuppositions
28
§ 6. Leading Question of Philosophy (τί τὸ ὄν) as the Question
Concerning the Being of Beings
27
§ 7. Preconceptual Understanding of Being and Greek
Philosophy's Basic Word for Being: οὐσία
29
a) The Character of Preconceptual Understanding of Being
and the Forgottenness of Being
32
b) The Ambiguity of οὐσία as Sign of the Richness and
Urgency of the Unmastered Problems in the Awakening
of the Understanding of Being
36
c) Everyday Speech and the Fundamental Meaning of
οὐσία Presence
37
d) The Self-concealed Understanding of Being (οὐσία) as
Constant Presence. Οὐσία as What Is Sought and Preunderstood
in the Leading Question of Philosophy
39
§ 8. Demonstration of the Hidden Fundamental Meaning of
οὐσία (Constant Presence) in the Greek Interpretation of
Movement. What-Being, and Being-Actual
(Being-Present)
39
a) Being and Movement: οὐσία as παρουσία of the ὑπομένον
43
b) Being and What-Being. οὐσία as the παρουσία of the
εἶδος
46
c) Being and Substance. The Further Development of the
Problem of Being as the Problem of Substance.
Substantiality and Constant Presence
46
d) Being and Actuality (Being-Present). The Inner
Structural Connection of οὐσία as παρουσία with
ἐνέργεια and Actualitas
51
§ 9. Being, Truth, Presence. The Greek Interpretation of Being
as Being-True in the Horizon of Being as Constant
Presence. The ὃν ὡς ἀληθές as κυριώτατον ὄv (Aristotle,
Metaphysics Θ 10)
51
a) Where the Inquiry Stands. The Previously Discussed
Meanings of Being and the Exemplary Status of Being-True
54
b) Four Meanings of Being in Aristotle. The Exclusion of
the ὃν ὡς ἀληθές in Metaphysics Ε 4
56
c) Thematic Discussion of the ὃν ὡς ἀληθές as the
κυριώτατον ὄν in Metaphysics Θ 10 and the Question of
Whether This Chapter Belongs to Book Θ. Connection
Between the Textual Question and the Substantive
Question of the Relation Between Being Qua BeingTrue
and Being Qua Being-Actual (ἐνέργεια ὄν)
56
α) The rejection of Θ 10's placement in Θ and the
traditional interpretation of being-true as a problem
of logic and epistemology (Schwegler, Jaeger, Ross).
The erroneous interpretation of κυριώτατα resulting
from this interpretation
58
β) Demonstration of Chapter 10's proper placement in
Book Θ. The ambiguity in the Greek concept of truth:
truth of things and truth of sentences (propositional
truth). The thematic discussion of the being-true of
(proper) beings (ἐπί τῶν πραγμάτων), not of
knowledge, in Chapter Θ 10
65
d) The Greek Understanding of Truth (ἀλήθεια) as
Deconcealment. The Being Which Is True (ἀληθές ὄν) as
the Most Proper Being (κυριώτατον ὄν). The Most
Proper Being as the Simple and Constantly Present
65
α) The correspondence between being and being-true
(deconcealment). Two fundamental types of being
and their corresponding modes of being-true
70
β) Truth, simplicity (unity) and constant presence.
The simple (ἀδιαίρετα, ἀσύνθετα, ἀπλᾶ) as the proper
being and its deconcealment as the highest mode
of being-true
73
γ) Deconcealment of the simple as pure and absolute
self-presence
75
e) The Question of the Being-True of Proper Beings as
the Highest and Deepest Question of Aristotle's
Interpretation of Being. Θ 10 as Keystone to Book Θ
and to Aristotelian Metaphysics in General
76
§ 10. The Actuality of Spirit in Hegel as Absolute Presence
79
Chapter Three
Working the Leading Question of Metaphysics through to the
Fundamental Question of Philosophy
80
§ 11. The Fundamental Question of Philosophy as the Question
Concerning the Primordial Connection between Being and
Time
83
§ 12. Man as the Site of the Fundamental Question.
Understanding of Being as the Ground of the Possibility of
the Essence of Man
89
§ 13. The Challenging Character of the Question of Being
(Fundamental Question) and the Problem of Freedom. The
Comprehensive Scope of Being (Going-after-the-Whole)
and the Challenging Individualization (Going-to-the-Roots)
of Time as the Horizon of the Understanding of
Being
92
§ 14. Switching the Perspective of the Question: the Leading
Question of Metaphysics as Grounded in the Question of
the Essence of Freedom
PART TWO
CAUSALITY AND FREEDOM
TRANSCENDENTAL AND PRACTICAL
FREEDOM IN KANT
99
Chapter One
Causality and Freedom as Cosmological Problem.
The First Way to Freedom in the Kantian System: the Question
of the Possibility of Experience as the Question of the Possibility
of Genuine Metaphysics
99
§ 15. Preliminary Remark on the Problem of Causality in the
Sciences
99
a) Causality as Expression of the Question worthiness of
Animate and Inanimate Nature in the Sciences
102
b) Causality in Modern Physics. Probability (Statistics) and
Causality
105
§ 16. First Attempt at Characterizing the Kantian Conception of
Causality and Its Fundamental Contexture: Causality and
Temporal Succession
107
§ 17. General Characterization of the Analogies of Experience
108
a) The Analogies of Experience as Rules of Universal
Temporal Determination of the Being-Present of That
Which Is Present in the Context of the Inner
Enablement of Experience
112
b) The Three Modes of Time (Permanence, Succession and
Simultaneity) as Modes of the Intra-Temporality of That
Which Is Present
113
c) The Distinction between Dynamical and Mathematical
Principles
114
d) The Analogies of Experience as Rules of the Basic
Relations of the Possible Being-in-Time of That Which Is
Present
115
§ 18. Discussion of the Mode of Proof of the Analogies of
Experience and Their Foundation from the Example of the
First Analogy. The Fundamental Meaning of the First
Analogy
115
a) The First Analogy: Permanence and Time
118
b) The Questionworthy Foundation of the Analogies: the
Unclarified Association of Time and 'I Think'
(Understanding) in an Uncritical Approach to the
Essence of Man as Finite Subject
119
c) The Analogies of Experience and the Transcendental
Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.
The Logical Structure of the Analogies of Experience
and the Question of Their Character as Analogies
121
d) The Fundamental Meaning of the First Analogy.
Permanence (Substantiality) and Causality
123
§ 19. The Second Analogy. Occurrence, Temporal Succession
and Causality
123
a) Event (Occurrence) and Temporal Succession. Analysis
of the Essence of Event and of the Possibility of Its
Perception
125
b) Excursus: on Essential Analysis and Analytic
128
c) Causality as Temporal Relation. Causality in the Sense
of Causation Is Running Ahead in Time as Determining
Letting-Follow
132
§ 20. Two Kinds of Causality: Natural Causality and the Causality
of Freedom. The General Ontological Horizon of the
Problem of Freedom in the Definition of Freedom as a Kind
of Causality. The Connection between Causality in General
and Being-Present as a Mode of Being
133
a) The Orientation of Causality in General to the Causality
of Nature. Toward the Problematic of Freedom as a Kind
of Causality
134
b) First Examination of Causality's Orientation to the
Mode of Being of Being-Present-in-Succession as the
Distinctive Temporal Mode of Causality and Illustrated
by the Simultaneity of Cause and Effect
136
c) Second Examination of Causality's Orientation to the
Mode of Being of Being-Present in Terms of the Concept
of Action. Action as the Succession-Concept in the
Connection between Cause and Effect
139
§ 21. The Systematic Site of Freedom according to Kant
139
a) The Systematic Site as Substantive Contexture Defining
the Direction and Scope of Questioning
141
b) Kant's Two Ways to Freedom and the Traditional
Problematic of Metaphysics. The Site of the Question of
Freedom in the Problem of the Possibility of Experience
as the Question Concerning the Possibility of Genuine
Metaphysics
144
§ 22. Causality through Freedom. Freedom as Cosmological Idea
144
a) The Problem of Freedom as Originating from the
Problem of World. Freedom as a Distinctive Mode of
Natural Causality
146
b) The Idea of Freedom as 'Transcendental Concept of
Nature': Absolute Natural Causality
148
§ 23. The Two Kinds of Causality and the Antithetic of Pure
Reason in the Third Antinomy
150
a) The Thesis of the Third Antinomy. The Possibility of
Causality through Freedom (Transcendental Freedom)
Alongside the Causality of Nature in the Explanation of
the Appearances of the World as Universal Ontological
Problem
153
b) The Antithesis of the Third Antinomy. The Exclusion of
Freedom from the Causality of the World-Process
154
c) The Special Character of the Cosmological Ideas in the
Question of the Possibility of Genuine Metaphysics.
Reason's Interest in Resolving the Antinomy
157
§ 24. Preparatory (Negative) Determinations Towards
Resolution of the Third Antinomy
157
a) The Delusion of Common Reason in the Handling of Its
Principle
160
b) The Distinction Between Appearance (Finite
Knowledge) and Thing-in-Itself (Infinite Knowledge) as
the Key to Resolving the Problem of the Antinomies
162
§ 25. The Positive Resolution of the Third Antinomy. Freedom as
the Causality of Reason: Transcendental Idea of an
Unconditioned Causality. Character and Limits of the
Problem of Freedom within the Problem of the Antinomies
162
a) The Resolution of the Problem of the Antinomies as
Going Beyond the Problem of Finite Knowledge to the
Problem of Human Finitude as Such
165
b) The Displacement of the Problem of the Resolution of
the Antinomies. The Question Concerning a Causation
for Appearances Outside the Appearances and
Conditions of Time. The Resolution of the Third
Antinomy in Looking Towards Man as Ethically Acting
Person
172
c) Empirical and Intelligible Character. The Intelligible
Character as the Mode of Causation of Causality from
Freedom. The Double Character of Appearance and the
Possibility of Two Fundamentally Different Causalities
in Relation to the Appearance as Effect
169
d) The Causality of Reason. Freedom as Intelligible
Causality: Transcendental Idea of an Unconditioned
Causality. The Application of the Universal Ontological
(Cosmological) Problematic to Man as World-Entity
178
Chapter Two
The Second Way to Freedom in the Kantian System.
Practical Freedom as Specific to Man as a Rational Being
179
§ 26. The Essence of Man as a Being of Sense and Reason. The
Distinction Between Transcendental and Practical Freedom
179
a) The Essence of Man (Humanity) as Person (Personality).
Personality and Self-Responsibility
180
b) The Two Ways to Freedom and the Distinction between
Transcendental and Practical Freedom. Possibility and
Actuality of Freedom
182
§ 27. The Actuality of Human (Practical) Freedom
182
a) Freedom as Fact. The Factuality (Actuality) of Practical
Freedom in Ethical Praxis and the Problem of Its
'Experience'. The Practical Reality of Freedom
186
b) The Essence of Pure Reason as Practical. Pure Practical
Reason as Pure Will
190
c) The Actuality of Pure Practical Reason in the Moral Law
192
d) The Categorical Imperative. On the Question of Its
Actuality and 'Universal Validity'
195
§ 28. The Consciousness of Human Freedom and Its Actuality
195
a) Pure Will and Actuality. The Specific Character of Will-governed
Actuality as Fact
198
b) The Fact of the Ethical Law and the Consciousness of
the Freedom of the Will
CONCLUSION
The Proper Ontological Dimension of Freedom. The Rootedness
of the Question of Being in the Question Concerning the
Essence of Human Freedom. Freedom as the Ground of
Causality
203
§ 29. The Limits of the Kantian Discussion of Freedom. Kant's
Binding of the Problem of Freedom to the Problem of
Causality
205
§ 30. Freedom as the Condition of the Possibility of the
Manifestness of the Being of Beings, i.e. of the
Understanding of Being
207
Editor's Afterword to the German Edition of July 1981
209
English-German Glossary
215
Greek-English Glossary
The Essence of Human Freedom (GA 31) [GA App]
Ereignis