aporia in which "death" and death can replace-and this is a metonymy that carries the name beyond the name and beyond the name of name-all that is only possible as impossible, if there is such a thing: love, the gin, the other, testimony, and so forth.
Second, it involves what from the beginning foils every methodological strategy and every stratagem of delimitation. Circumscription is the impossible. I hope that I have convinced you my purpose was not to justify a passage beyond knowledge, anthropothanatology, biology, or the metaphysics of death toward a more radical, originary, or fundamental thought, as if the limit were a known edge between, on the one hand, anthropology (be it even a fundamental anthropology) and, on the other hand, ontology, an existential analysis, and more generally a more questioning thought of death in general. On the contrary, based on the example of Heidegger or of the virtual debate among Heidegger, Levinas, and Freud, my discourse was aimed at suggesting that this fundamentalist dimension is untenable and that it cannot even claim to have any coherence or rigorous specificity. It remains untenable, even if one thinks in an original way the limits of this coherence or of this specificity in the form of a system, of the unity of a field, or of an archi-region, etc. While the richest or most necessary anthropo-thanatology cannot found itself in any other way than on presuppositions that do not belong to its knowledge or its competence, and while these presuppositions therefore constitute a style of questioning of which Heidegger, Freud, and Levinas are remarkable witnesses, conversely this fundamental questioning cannot protect itself from a hidden bio-anthropo-thanato-theological contamination.
Finally, since this contaminating contraband remains irreducible, it already insinuates itself through the idiom of the existential analysis. One will always be able to consider the existential analysis as a witness-and I keep for this term witness the ambiguity by which, as you may remember, we characterized the clause of belonging without belonging that is the condition of any testimony, and of its language first of all. What is analysis witness to? Well, precisely to that from which it demarcates itself, here mainly from