and yet he does not know it, because, in the first place, he grasps beingness as objectivity and because this interpretation of beingness then completely cuts off every question of being. The "ontological difference" once again seems to be something "new," which it cannot be and does not want to be. It is the name only of that which bears the entire history of philosophy and as such could never be for philosophy (in the form of metaphysics) something that had to be questioned and thus named. It is something transitional in the transition from the end of metaphysics to the other beginning.
The inceptual history of beyng itself, however, is the reason this differentiation can be named the structure of the realm of Western metaphysics and indeed must be named in this indeterminate form. Φύσις implies that, for the most general representation (thinking), being is what is most present in the greatest constancy and as such is, so to speak, the emptiness of the presentness itself. Insofar as thinking has fallen under the dominance of "logic," this presentness of everything which comes to presence (everything objectively present) is understood as the highest universality and—despite the stricture of Aristotle that being is not a γένος—as the "most general." If we keep in mind this historical provenance of the ontological difference out of the very history of being, then the knowledge of this provenance already compels us into the anticipatory distance of the belongingness to the truth of being and into the experience that, inasmuch as we are borne by the "ontological difference" in all our specifically human relatedness to beings, we remain exposed to the power of beyng more essentially in this way than in any ever so "close to life" relation to something "real."
This, the pervasive disposedness of the human being by beyng itself, must furthermore be made experienceable through the naming of the "ontological difference"—i.e., if the very question of being is to be awakened as a question. On the other hand, with respect to the overcoming of metaphysics (i.e., with respect to the historical interplay between the first and the other beginning), the "ontological difference" must be clarified in its belonging to Da-sein and, seen in that regard, will assume the form of a, indeed the, "basic structure" of Da-sein itself.
267. Beyng2
(Event)
Beyng is the appropriating event. This term names beyng in a thoughtful way and grounds the essential occurrence of beyng in the structure
2. Cf. the saying "of" beyng, p. 372f.