of the grounding of the essence of truth (manifestness, the clearing of the "there," Da-sein). To speak of the understanding of being that belongs to Da-sein is redundant; it says the same thing twice and even makes it weaker. For Da-sein "is" precisely the grounding of the truth of beyng as event.
The understanding of being moves within the differentiation between beingness and beings, without yet being able to bring to "validity" the origin of the differentiation out of the decisional essence of beyng.
The understanding of being, however, is everywhere the opposite of making beyng dependent on human opinion; indeed, it is in this regard even more essentially other than a mere opposite. Where the very matter at issue is the demolishing of the subject, how could being be made "subjective"?
265. The inventive thinking of beyng1
The inventive thinking of beyng-this locution is supposed to name a way, and in the transition perhaps the decisive way, in which the future human being of the West takes over the essential occurrence of the truth of beyng and thus becomes historical for the first time. To become historical means to arise out of the essence of beyng and therefore to remain belonging to the essential occurrence of the truth of beyng; it does not mean to be delivered over to the past and to historiological findings.
Now, however, historical reflection on the history of metaphysics shows that thinking has been the guideline in the entire history of the carrying out of the guiding question ("beingness and thinking"). This reflection leads to the insight that the predominance of thinking (the fact that it itself became the guideline in the form of the representation of something in general) more and more forced the interpretation of the beingness of beings into that direction which had to lead finally to the identification of being with the objectivity of beings, i.e., with representedness in general. And this insight makes it known that thinking and its predominance (in the treatment of the guiding question and the choice of the guideline) in the end obstructed every path to the question of the truth of beyng, i.e., to a possible way of being compelled into that question. And now is inventive thinking nevertheless supposed to become the avenue to the truth of beyng, indeed not only thinking but inventive thinking, which is, so to speak, the highest elevation of the predominance of thinking,
1. Cf. Überlegungen VII, p. 78ff.