200
IV. The Leap [253-255]

And so the "Kant book" is perforce thoroughly ambiguous. Yet it is not a contingent offering, because Kant is still the only one since the Greeks who brings the interpretation of beingness (οὐσία) into a certain relation with "time" and thereby becomes a witness to the hidden reign of the connection between beingness and time.

Nevertheless, for him, as already for the Greeks, thinking (λόγος—forms of judgment—categories—reason) remains primary in establishing the horizon for the interpretation of beings as such. Over and above this and as a consequence of the procedure of Descartes, thinking as "thinking" gains mastery, and beings themselves become on the same historical basis in each case perceptum (the represented). That is, they become objects. Therefore, a grounding of Dasein could not be at issue here; in other words, the question of the truth of beyng cannot be raised in such a way.



135. The essential occurrence of beyng as event
(the relation between Da-sein and beyng)


This essential occurrence includes the ap-propriation of Da-sein. Accordingly, to speak in the strict sense of the relation of Da-sein to beyng is misleading, inasmuch as it implies that beyng essentially occurs "for itself" and that Da-sein then takes up a relation to beyng.

The relation of Da-sein to beyng pertains intrinsically to the essential occurrence of beyng itself, which could also be conveyed by saying that beyng needs Da-sein and does not at all essentially occur without this appropriation.

The appropriating event is so strange that it seems first to be completed through this relation to an other, whereas its essential occurrence without the relation is indeed radically impossible.

To speak of the relation of Da-sein makes beyng ambiguous; it makes beyng into something over and against, which it is not—inasmuch as it itself first appropriates precisely that which it is supposed to be over and against. Therefore this relation is also utterly incomparable to the subject-object relation.


136. Beyng5



Beyng—the remarkable erroneous belief is that beyng must always "be" and that the more constantly and the longer it is, the "more eminently" it is.



5. Überlegungen V, pp. 17f., 34, 51f.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger