thinking of beyng. And all concepts of beyng must be uttered from there.
Conversely: everything which-at first and in the plight and merely in the transition from the developed guiding question to the basic question—is thought about beyng and is interrogated as a way to the truth of beyng (the unfolding of Da-sein) must never be translated into the groundless wasteland of any previous "ontology" or "doctrine of categories."
The tacit presentiment of the event offers itself prominently and at once in historical recollection (οὐσία = παρουσία ["presence"]) as "primordial temporality": the occurrence of the having-been/preserving and futural/anticipating transporting, i.e., the occurrence of the opening and grounding of the "there" and thus of the essence of truth.
"Primordial temporality" is never meant as an improved version of the concept of time, as the usual substitution of "lived time" (Bergson- Dilthey) for the concept of calculable time. All of that remains outside the recognized necessity of the transition from the guiding question, grasped as such, to the basic question.
In Being and Time, "time" is a directive toward, and a resonating with, that which takes place in the uniqueness of the ap-propriation as the truth of the essential occurrence of beyng.
It is only here, in this original interpretation of time, that the realm is encountered in which time and space reach the most extreme differentiation and thus precisely attain the most intimate essential occurrence. This relation is prepared in the presentation of the spatiality of Da-sein, which is not the spatiality of the "subject" or the "I" (cf. The grounding, space).
The confusion and lack of discipline in contemporary "thinking"
require us to grasp its ways almost catechetically, i.e., in the form of
identified "questions." To be sure, the will and style of decisive
thought never reside in a more didactic meditation on these questions.
Yet for the sake of clarity, especially over and against the idle
talk of "ontology" and "being," what must be known first is the
following:
Beings are.
Beyng essentially occurs.
"Beings"—this term names not only the actual (and certainly not if
this is taken as the present at hand and the latter merely as the object of
knowledge), not only the actual of any sort, but at the same time the
possible, the necessary, and the accidental, everything that stands in
beyng in any way whatever, even including negativity and nothingness.
Those who fancy themselves only too clever and immediately