CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINAL ONTOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DASEIN
The surrounding world — when examined with regard to its presence [Anwesenheit] — is structured according to its own significations and references. Concerned engagement dwells in this context, although it does not recognize it as such. But it does know its way around its surrounding world. This acquaintance with our own particular surrounding area, by which concerned engagement guides itself, adheres to the significations that are encountered. We are beginning to get a clearer idea of what was indicated by apparency: what concerned being-in-the-world ordinarily dwells upon are not discrete, occurring things, but rather the significations [Verweisungen] — the 'from here — to there' within the context of concerned 'in order to'. Therefore it is in these significations that the original ontological structure of the encountered world lies. These significations are the way in which the encounter with the world shows itself. Significations (something is useful for, of importance to, produced from) is a 'signifying about', in the sense that what the signification is about, 'the signified' [Be-deutete]', is itself to be found in the signifying. This signifying signification is originally directed at concerned engagement with the world [besorgenden Umgang].
Concerned being-in-the-world has opened-up its world relative to this possibility to encounter it. As concern, it has entrusted itself to the guidance of the surrounding world. Signification is the way in which we encounter the surrounding world. When we are concernfully immersed in the world [besorgende Aufgehen], as well as when we lose ourselves in it, we allow ourselves, as it were, to be carried along by these significations. So we have now identified the basic character of encountering the world- signification [Bedeutsamkeit].
Hence 'signifying' does not mean that natural objects, having previously been there as mere object-like things, are then endowed by a subject with value properties that are not truly characteristic of these [24] entities. On the contrary, we identify signification as the world's primary ontological characteristic [primären Seinscharakters der Welt] in order to provide a basis on which to show that the ontological characteristics of the natural world [Seinscharaktere des Naturseins] have a specific origin. We can only fully explicate signification by producing a well-founded ontological exposition of Dasein's being that clarifies the following: a) why ontological research initially skipped over signification and has continued to do so; b) why signification is still seen as requiring explication and derivation, even though an ersatz phenomenon [Ersatzphänomen] in the form of the natural object with added-on value properties has been put
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