are in a different way than others. McDaniel, thus, interprets Heidegger as someone sharing these ontological commitments on a phenomenological ground. First of all, Heidegger underscores the importance of the phenomenological evidence according to which all entities are. For this reason, he agrees with the idea that there is a general concept of Being which applies to all entities whatsoever. Second, Heidegger remarks upon the relevance of the phenomenological evidence according to which some entities are in a different way than others. According to our everyday experience, some entities are pieces of equipment (let’s say, a hammer), some entities are simply located in space and time (let’s say, a stone), some entities are abstract objects (let’s say, a prime number), and some other entities are human beings (let’s say, my wife). For this reason, Heidegger agrees with the idea that, since all these entities appear to be in different ways, “there is a multiplicity of modes of Being” (McDaniel, 2017, p. 18). In Heidegger’s jargon, the mode of Being of a piece of equipment is ready-to-hand; the mode of Being of an entity which is simply located in space and time is present-at-hand; the mode of Being of an abstract entity is subsistence; the mode of Being of a human being is existenz.
In light of this exegetical framework, it is important to notice that McDaniel begins to understand Heidegger’s notion of Being by taking Being to be synonymous with existence. For this reason, in a Quinean fashion, McDaniel argues that the general concept of Being can be spelled out through the unrestricted existential quantifier while the multiplicity of modes of Being can be understood through the use of restricted existential quantifiers. On the one hand, the general concept of Being is represented by a quantifier which ranges over whatever exists, regardless of which mode of Being an entity enjoys. For any existing entity, y, we can truly say that ∃y(y = x). On the other hand, each mode of Being is represented by a quantifier which ranges only over a proper subset of the domain of the unrestricted one. The mode of Being of a hammer is represented by a ready-to-hand quantifier (∃ready-to-hand) which ranges over pieces of equipment; the mode of Being of a stone is represented by a present-at-hand quantifier (∃present-at-hand) which ranges over entities which are simply located in space and time; the mode of Being of a prime number is represented by a subsistencial quantifier (∃subsistence) which ranges over abstract entities; the mode of Being of my wife is represented by an existenzial quantifier (∃existenz) which ranges over human beings.
It might be interesting to notice that, according to this brief summary of McDaniel’s ideas, his interpretation should appear to be close to the one defended by Gadamer. Contra Richardson and Olafson, both McDaniel and Gadamer focus their attention on the fact that Being, rather than simply making entities be, makes entities what they are, that is, hammers, stones, prime numbers, and fictional characters. Not only does McDaniel focus his attention on modes of Being by discussing how