down to itself, free for death, in a possibility that it inherited and yet has chosen.
Dasein can only be reached by the blows of fate because in the basis of its being it is fate in the sense described. Existing fatefully in resoluteness handing itself down, Dasein is disclosed as being-in-the-world for the "coming" of "fortunate" circumstances and for the cruelty of chance. Fate does not first originate with the collision of circumstances and events. Even an irresolute person is driven by them, more so than someone who has chosen, and yet he can "have" no fate.
If Dasein, anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself, then, as free for death, it understands itself in its own higher power of its finite freedom. In this way it takes over the powerlessness of being abandoned to itself in that freedom, which always only is in having chosen the choice, and it becomes clear about the chance elements in the situation disclosed. But if fateful Dasein essentially exists as being-in-the-world in being-with others, then its occurrence is an occurrence-with and is determined as destiny [Geschick]. With this term, we designate the occurrence of the community of a people. Destiny is not composed of individual fates, nor can being-with-:one-another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects.7 These fates are already guided beforehand in being-with-one-another in the same world and in the resoluteness for definite possibilities. In communication and in struggle the power of destiny first [385] becomes free. The fateful destiny of Dasein in and with its "generation"8 constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Dasein.
Fate is the powerless higher power making itself available for adversities, the power of reticent self-projection, ready for anxiety, upon one's own being-guilty. As such, fate requires the constitution of being of care, that is, temporality, as the ontological condition of its possibility. Only if death, guilt, conscience, freedom, and finitude live together equiprimordially in the being of a being, as they do in care, can that being exist in the mode of fate, that is, be historical in the ground of its existence.
Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be thrown back upon its factical there, free for its death and shattering itself on it, that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own thrownness and be in the Moment for "its time." Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible.
It is not necessary that resoluteness explicitly know the provenance of the possibilities upon which it projects itself. However, in the temporality of Dasein, and only in it, lies the possibility of explicitly
7. Cf. § 26.
8. On the concept of "generation," cl. W. Dilthey, "Über das Studium der Geschichte der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und dem Staat" (1875), Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5 (1924), pp. 36-41.