world has been shattered, the isolated subject is all that remains and it becomes the basis that is then joined together with a "world."
The multiplicity of attempts at a solution of the "problem of reality" developed through the various kinds of realism and idealism, and in the positions which mediate between them, cannot be discussed in this inquiry at any great length. Certainly there is a core of genuine [207] understanding to be found in each of these solutions, but it would be wrong if one wanted to .achieve a tenable solution to the problem by counting up how much is correct in each case. Rather, what is needed is the basic insight that the various epistemological directions do not so much go off the track epistemologically, but that, because they neglect the existential analytic of Dasein in general, they do not even attain the basis for a phenomenally secured problematic. Nor is this basis to be attained by subsequent phenomenological improvements of the concept of the subject and consciousness.* Such a procedure would not guarantee that the inappropriate line of questioning would not, after all, remain.
With Dasein as being-in-the-world, innerworldly beings have already been disclosed. This existential and ontological statement seems to agree with the thesis of realism that the external world is objectively present in a real way. Since the objective presence of innerworldly beings is not denied in this existential statement, it agrees in its result, so to speak, doxographically, with the thesis of realism. But it is distinguished in principle from all realism in that realism believes that the reality of the "world" needs proof, and at the same time is capable of proof. Both views are directly negated in the existential statement. But what completely separates it from realism is the lack of ontological comprehension in realism. After all, it tries to explain reality ontically by real connections of interaction between real things.
As opposed to realism, idealism, no matter how contrary† and untenable it might be, has a fundamental priority, if it does not misunderstand itself as "psychological" idealism. If idealism emphasizes the fact that being and reality are only "in consciousness," this expresses the understanding that being cannot be explained by beings. But to the extent that it remains unclarified that an understanding of being occurs here and what this understanding of being means ontologically, how it is possible, and that it belongs to the constitution of being of Dasein,‡ idealism constructs the interpretation of reality in a vacuum. The fact that being cannot be explained by beings, and that reality is only possible in the understanding of being, does not absolve us from
* Leap into Da-sein.
† Namely, to existential and ontological experience.
‡ And Dasein belongs to the essence of being as such.