for whom the "work" is to be done. In the kind of being of these things at hand, that is, in their relevance, there lies an essential reference to possible wearers for whom they should be "made to measure." Similarly, the producer or "supplier" is encountered in the material used as one who "serves" well or badly. The field, for example, along which we walk "outside" shows itself as belonging to such and such a [118] person who keeps it in good order, the book which we use is bought at such and such a place, given by such and such a person, and so on. The boat anchored at the shore refers in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes his voyages with it, but even as a "boat which is unknown to us," it still points to others. The others who are "encountered" in the context of useful things in the surrounding world at hand are not somehow added on in thought to an initially merely objectively present thing, but these "things" are encountered from the world in which they are at hand for the others. This world is always already from the outset my own. In our previous analysis, the scope of what is encountered in the world was initially narrowed down to useful things at hand, or nature objectively present, thus to beings of a character unlike Dasein. This restriction was not only necessary for the purpose of simplifying the explication, but, above all, because the kind of being of the existence of others encountered within the surrounding world is distinct from handiness and objective presence. The world of Dasein thus frees beings which are not only completely different from tools and things, but which themselves in accordance with their kind of being as Dasein are themselves "in" the world as being-in-the-world in which they are at the same time encountered. These beings are neither objectively present nor at hand, but they are like the very Dasein which frees them—they are there, too, and there with it. So, if one wanted to identify the world in general with innerworldly beings, one would have to say the "world" is also Dasein.
But the characteristic of encountering others is, after all, oriented toward one's own Dasein. Does not it, too, start with the distinction and isolation of the "I," so that a transition from this isolated subject to others must then be sought? In order to avoid this misunderstanding, we must observe in what sense we are talking about "others." "Others" does not mean everybody else but me—those from whom the I distinguishes itself. Others are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one also is. This being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of being objectively present "with" them within a world. The "with" is of the character of Dasein, the "also" means the sameness of being [Sein] as circumspect, heedful being-in-the-world. "With" and "also" are to be understood existentially, not categorially. On the basis of this with-bound [mithaften] being-in-the-world, the world is always already