393 II. 4
Being and Time

belongs to the phenomenon remains a 'feeling of pleasure or displeasure'.

How is the temporality of anxiety related to that of fear? We have called the phenomenon of anxiety a basic state-of-mind.vU Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its ownmost Being-thrown and reveals the uncanniness of everyday familiar Being-in-the-world. Anxiety, like fear, has its character formally determined by something in the face of which one is anxious and something. about which one is anxious. But our analysis has shown that these two phenomena coincide. This does not mean that their structural characters are melted away into one another, as if anxiety were anxious neither in the face of anything nor about anything. Their coinciding means rather that the entity by which both these structures are filled in [das sie erfüllende Seiende] is the same—namely Da:sein. In particular, that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite with which one can concern oneself; the threatening does not come from what is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather from the fact that neither of these 'says' anything any longer. Environmental entities no longer have any involvement. The world in which I exist has sunk into insignificance; and the world which is thus disclosed is one in which entities can be freed only in the character of having no involvement. Anxiety is anxious in the face of the "nothing" of the world; but this does not mean that in anxiety we experience something like the absence of what is present-at-hand within-the-world. The present-at-hand must be encountered in just such a way that it does not have any involvement whatsoever, but can show itself in an empty mercilessness. This implies, however, that our concernful awaiting finds nothing in terms of which it might be able to understand itself; it clutches at the "nothing" of the world; but when our understanding has come up against the world, it is brought to Being-in-the-world as such through anxiety. Being-in-the world, however, is both what anxiety is anxious in-the-face-of and what it is anxious about. To be anxious in-the-face-of . . . does not have the character of an expecting or of any kind of awaiting. That in-the-face-of which one has anxiety is indeed already 'there'—namely, Dasein itself In that case, does not anxiety get constituted by a future? Certainly; but not by the inauthentic future of awaiting.

Anxiety discloses an insignificance of the world; and this insignificance reveals the nullity of that with which one can concern oneself—or, in other words, the impossibility of projecting oneself upon a potentiality-for-Being which belongs to existence and which is founded primarily upon one's objects of concern. The revealing of this impossibility, however, signifies that one is letting the possibility of an authentic potentiality-forBeing be lit up. What is the temporal meaning of this revealing? Anxiety

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger