for his idea of a 'psychology which both describes and dissects'. But he is kept from working out the analysis of this phenomenon correctly by the epistemological problematic of Reality. The 'principle of phenomenality' does not enable him to come to an ontological Interpretation of the Being of consciousness. 'Within the same consciousness,' he writes, 'the will and its inhibition emerge.'^xviii What kind of Being belongs to this 'emerging'? What is the meaning of the Being of the 'within'? What relationship-of-Being does consciousness bear to the Real itself? All this must be determined ontologically. That this has not been done, depends ultimately on the fact that Dilthey has left 'life' standing in such a manner that it is ontologically undifferentiated; and of course 'life' is something which one cannot go back 'behind'. But to Interpret Dasein ontologically does not signify that we must go back ontically to some other entity. The fact that [210] Dilthey has been refuted epistemologically cannot prevent us from making fruitful use of what is positive in his analyses—the very thing that has not been understood in such refutations.

Thus Scheler has recently taken up Dilthey's Interpretation of Reality.^xix He stands for a 'voluntative theory of Dasein'. Here "Dasein" is understood in the Kantian sense as Being-present-at-hand. The 'Being of objects is given immediately only in the way it is related to drive and will'. Scheler not only emphasizes, as does Dilthey, that Reality is never primarily given in thinking and apprehending; he also points out particularly that cognition [Erkennen] itself is not judgment, and that knowing [Wissen] is a 'relationship of Being'.

What we have already said about the ontological indefiniteness of Dilthey's foundations holds in principle for this theory too. Nor can the fundamental ontological analysis of 'life' be slipped in afterwards as a substructure. Such a fundamental analysis provides the supporting conditions for the analysis of Reality—for the entire explication of the character of resisting and its phenomenal presuppositions. Resistance is encountered in a not-coming-through, and it is encountered as a hindrance to willing to come through. With such willing, however, something must already have been disclosed which one's drive and one's will are out for. But what they are out for is ontically indefinite, and this indefiniteness must not be overlooked ontologically or taken as if it were nothing. When Being-out-for-something comes up against resistance, and can do nothing but 'come up against it', it is itself already alongside a totality of involvements. But the fact that this totality has been discovered is grounded in the disclosedness of the referential totality of significance. The experiencing of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to one's endeavours—is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the World. The character