into 'the 'things themselves' and attain the status of a problematic which has been cleared up conceptually.
Our Interpretation of language h as been designed merely to point out the ontological 'locus' of this phenomenon in Dasein's state of Being, and especially to prepare the way for the following analysis, in which, taking as our clue a fundamental kind of Being belonging to discourse, in connection with other phenomena, we shall try to bring Dasein's everydayness into view in a manner which is ontologically more primordial.
In going back to the existential structures of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, our Interpretation has, in a way, lost sight of Dasein's [167] everydayness. In our analysis, we must now regain this phenomenal horizon which was our thematical starting-point. The question now arises: what are the existential characteristics of the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world, so far as the latter, as something which is everyday, maintains itself in the kind of Being of the "they"? Does the "they" have a state-of-mind which is specific to it, a special way of understanding, talking, and interpreting? It becomes all the more urgent to answer these questions when we remember that proximally and for the most part Dasein is absorbed in the "they" and is mastered by it. Is not Dasein, as thrown Being-in-the-world, thrown proximally right into the publicness of the "they"? And what does this publicness mean, other than the specific disclosedness of the "they"?
If understanding must be conceived primarily as Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, then it is from an analysis of the way of understanding and interpreting which belongs to the "they" that we must gather which possibilities of its Being have been disclosed and appropriated by Dasein as "they". In that case, however, these possibilities themselves make manifest an essential tendency of Being—one which belongs to everydayness. And finally, when this tendency has been explicated in an ontologically adequate manner, it must unveil a primordial kind of Being of Dasein, in such a way, indeed, that from this kind of Being1 the phenomenon of thrownness, to which we have called attention, can be exhibited in its existential concreteness.
In the first instance what is required is that the disclosedness of the "they"—that is, the everyday kind of Being of discourse, sight, and interpretation—should be made visible in certain definite phenomena. In
1 Reading '... von ihr aus ...'. The earliest editions omit 'aus'; correction is made in a list of errata.