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Being and Time

ontology of the present-at-hand—an ontology which, moreover, is still a rough one. So no matter in how many ways this logic may be improved and expanded, it cannot in principle be made any more flexible. Such reforms of logic, oriented towards the ' humane sciences', only increase the ontological confusion.

The "they" is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution. It itself has, in turn, various possibilities of becoming concrete as something characteristic of Dasein [seiner daseinsmässigen Konkretion] . The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history.

The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self,1 which we distinguish from the authentic Self—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way [eigens ergriffenen]. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the "they", and must first find itself. This dispersal characterizes the 'subject' of that kind of Being which we know as concernful absorption in the world we encounter as closest to us. If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this means at the same time that the "they" itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lies closest. Dasein is for the sake of the "they" in an everyday manner, and the "they" itself Articulates the referential context of significance.2 When entities are encountered, Dasein's world frees them for a totality of involvements with which the "they" is familiar, and within the limits which have been established with the "they's" averageness. Proximally, factical Dasein is in the with-world, which is discovered in an average way. Proximally, it is not 'I', in the sense of my own Self, that 'am', but rather the Others, whose way is that of the "they".3 In terms of the "they", and as the "they", I am 'given' proximally to 'myself' [mir "selbst"]. Proximally Dasein is "they", and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein discovers the world in its own way [eigens] and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way.

With this Interpretation of Being-with and Being-one's-Self in the

1 ' . . . das Man-selbst . . .' This expression is also to be distinguished from 'das Man selbst' ('the "they" itself'), which appears elsewhere in this paragraph. In the first of these expressions 'selbst' appears as a substantive, in the second as a mere intensive.

2 'Das Man selbst, worum-willen das Dasein alltäglich ist, artikuliert den Verweisungszusammenhang der Bedeutsamkeit.' It is also possible to construe 'alltäglich' as a predicate adjective after 'ist'; in that case we should read: 'Dasein is everyday for the sake of the "they".'

3 'Zunächst "bin" nicht "ich" im Sinne des eigenen Selbst, sondern die Anderen in der Weise des Man.' In the earlier editions there are commas after '"ich"' and 'Anderen', which would suggest a somewhat different interpretation.

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger