vorausspringt] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care—that is, to the existence of the Other, not to a "what" with which he is concerned; it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it.
Solicitude proves to be a state of Dasein's Being—one which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up with its Being towards the world of its concern, and likewise with its authentic Being towards itself. Being with one another is based proximally and often exclusively upon what is a matter of common concern in such Being. A Being-with-one-another which arises [entspringt] from one's doing the same thing as someone else, not only keeps for the most part within the outer limits, but enters the mode of distance and reserve. The Being-with-one-another of those who are hired for the same affair often thrives only on mistrust. On the other hand, when they devote themselves to the same affair in common, their doing so is determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been taken hold of.1 They thus become authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of objectivity [die rechte Sachlichkeit], which frees the Other in his freedom for himself.
Everyday Being-with-one-another maintains itself between the two extremes of positive solicitude-that which leaps in and dominates, and that which leaps forth and liberates [vorspringend-befreienden] . It brings numerous mixed forms to maturity;2 to describe these and classify them would take us beyond the limits of this investigation.
Just as circumspection belongs to concern as a way of discovering what is [123] ready-to-hand, solicitude is guided by considerateness and forbearance.3 Like solicitude, these can range through their respective deficient and Indifferent modes up to the point of inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads the way.4
1 'Umgekehrt ist das gemeinsame Sicheinsetzen für dieselbe Sache aus dem je eigens ergriffenen Dasein bestimmt.'
2 Reading '... und zeitigt mannigfache Mischformen ...' with the older editions. The later editions have 'zeigt' ('shows') instead of 'zeitigt' ('brings to maturity'). On 'zeitigen' see H. 304 and our note ad loc.
3 'Wie dem Besorgen als Weise des Entdeckens des Zuhandenen die Umsicht zugehört, so ist die Fürsorge geleitet durch die Rücksicht und Nachsicht.' Heidegger is here calling attention to the etymological kinship of the three words which he italicizes, each of which stands for a special kind of sight or seeing ('Sicht').
The italicization of 'Umsicht' ('circumspection') is introduced in the newer editions.
4 '... bis zur Rücksichtslosigkeit und dem Nachsehen, das die Gleichgültigkeit leitet.' This passage is ambiguous both syntactically and semantically. It is not clear, for instance, whether the subject of the relative clause is 'die Gleichgültigkeit' or the pronoun 'das', though we prefer the former interpretation. 'Nachsehen', which is etymologically akin to 'Nachsicht', means to 'inspect' or 'check' something; but it often means to do this in a very perfunctory manner, and this latter sense may well be the one which Heidegger has in mind.