to understand the primitive mode of disposition. The affective as such already has the character of having-itself. Ἡδονή reaches into the being of being-there so originarily that it can be identified with ζῆν. Ἡδονή belongs to being-there itself.
This disposition, expressed through ἡδονή, has a dual possibility: (1) insofar as this finding-itself has the character of αἵρεσις, (2) insofar as it is φυγή.342 The disposition is characterized, at the same time, as “going toward,” “seizing,” going toward being-there itself; or a disposition whose character “recoils from” being-there, “flees” from it in a certain respect. This is given in ἡδονή vis-à-vis λύπη. Αἵρεσις and φυγή are the characteristics that characterize the basic possibility of living as a way of being with itself. Αἵρεσις and φυγή are the basic motivations of being-there. It is no accident that αἵρεσις and φυγή appear where it is a question of the ultimate ontological interpretation of being-there.343 Since ἡδονή vis-à-vis λύπη is apprehended originarily with the being-there of living things, and constitutes the basic disposition—the mode in which being-there to a certain extent affects itself—ἡδονή can be characterized as πάθος, a πάθος of the sort that Aristotle says is ἐγκεχρωσμένον,344 “colored through and through,” the sort of πάθος that completely colors, or permeates, βίος, “being-there.” βίος, not ζωή: βίος as “existence,” “living” in the emphatic sense of human beings taking hold of themselves in προαίρεσις. Another closer form is seen when Aristotle constantly says that with every concern, ἡδονή and λύπη are co-given; with every πάθος, but equally with every perceiving, every thinking, considering, with θεωρία, to the extent that they are basic modes of living, ἡδονή is an inseparable companion.345
I will succinctly summarize the determinations of πάθος. The disgression that we have pursued (with consideration of De Partibus Animalium) showed that πάθος, insofar as one characterizes it according to its εἶδος, is determined as being-in-the-world: determination of the πρὸς ἄλληλα. Insofar as ἡδονή is co-given with every πάθος, being-in is itself possessed, possessed in the two possibilities of αἵρεσις and φυγή. The being of living things as πάθος is a being that has the character of coming-to-be-taken and of being-taken. Therein lies the aspect of μεταβολή, of losing-composure and being-out-of-composure—change from ... to ... A further determination of πάθος in Rhetoric, Book 2, Chapter 1, the aspect of the changing of κρίνειν: in this losing-composure, κρίνειν,346 “distinguishing,” “taking a position,” is undergone as well; the manner and mode of being oriented toward the world or in the world is also
342. Eth. Nic. Β 2, 1104 b 30 sq.: τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς. Κ 2, 1172 b 19 sqq.: τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ’ αὑτὸ πᾶσιν φευκτὸν εἶναι, ὁμοίως δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον αἱρετόν. [ . . . ] τοιοῦτο δ’ ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.
343. De an. Γ 7, 431 a 9 sqq.
344. Eth. Nic. Β 2, 1105 a 3.
345. Cf. Eth. Nic. Κ 4, 1174 b 20 sqq.
346. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 20 sq.: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.