fantasized reflection upon being-there, but rather in venturing-out into being-there according to the possibilities of existence as encountered. For this determination should not be conceived as though there were a τέχνη for this taking-opportunites and venturing-out into the δεινά of life. οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ’ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτούς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν.202 Nor is there a παραγγελία for this, something like a universal military field order, an a priori ethics, by which humanity becomes better eo ipso. Everyone must have, for himself, his eyes trained on that which is at the moment and which matters to him.
Thus it follows that the how of being-composed is to be cultivated in relation to being-there, as ἕξις is oriented in this way. However, there is a difficulty in this formulation of the γένεσις of ἕξις, insofar as the question arises: what, in general, does it mean to become just through acting justly? Of course, I must already be just to act justly.203 Aristotle discusses this difficulty in Book 2, Chapter 3, of the Nicomachean Ethics. He resolves this difficulty by recourse to relations of a different sort, in τέχνη.204 In τέχνη, it depends upon the γιγνόμενα behaving in the right manner. Shoemaking depends upon the shoe, the τέλος, the ἔργον, behaving in the right manner, and thereby being a good, suitable shoe. Nothing further comes into question here. By contrast, we know that the being of human beings is determined in its ἔργον as πρᾶξις. This has the τέλος in itself, comes to its end through itself. For this reason, the basic conditions governing the ἔργον of human beings are entirely different than those in the case of a τέχνη. For this πρᾶξις, it depends on how the one acting, as such, behaves toward himself. It depends on ἕξις, being-composed and this πῶς ἔχων of the πράττων,205 the “how” of the “one acting” is defined in accordance with three aspects:
1. εἰδώς206—φρόνησις: he must be “knowing,” must act in the right “condition of looking around,” which is oriented toward the καιρός with respect to the subject matter.
2. προαιρούμενος,207 he must act from out of himself “on the basis of an actual being-resolved to . . .”
3. Acting in such a way that he is thereby βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων,208 “stable and not to be brought out of composure.” This recalls the determination of πάθος as δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες;209 we are brought out of one frame of mind into another. What is characteristic is not the resulting condition,
202. Eth. Nic. Β 2, 1104 a 7 sqq.
203. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 a 17 sqq.: ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις τῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι [ . . . ] εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια [ . . . ], ἤδη εἰσὶν δίκαιοι.
204. Cf. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 a 26 sqq.
205. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 a 30 sq.
206. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 a 31.
207. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 a 31 sq.
208. Eth. Nic. Β 3, 1105 a 33.
209. Rhet. Β 1, 1378 a 20 sq.