for the modification of its style so that possibilities of particular forms of experience arise out of this modification?

I can in factical experience, in the context of expectation, living unreflectively, still mindfully experience and thereby be thoughtful of the full web of motivation. I can recall what I have experienced by way of memory, and indeed in reminiscing, I thoroughly savor it again factically. What I experience can weigh on me, occupy me, or I can, in taking interest in the experience, take notice of it, especially bear it in mind. I can "relate" what I experience and indeed in its factically vital movements or "pulls:'' People engage in discussion about common, shared life-experience and mutually relate everything to one another once again. People do not give lectures to one another, and it is, totally apart from the what-character of objectivity, completely different than if I were to describe in zoology exactly what I see in the microscope.

Factically experienced contexts of meaningfulness will indeed be exp! icated, but still left in their vital facticity. The explication takes-notice and narrates, but in the basic style of factical experiencing, of fully going-along with life.2

[112] Taking-notice [Kenntnisnehmen], as this mode of objectification should be called, which maintains itself in the style of factical experiencing and which is not theoretical-scientific, is encountered in various forms of expression, forms of daily, personal or public, dealings. It can be a taking-notice that is making-present or that is realizing, and in the interchange it is, at the same time, giving-notice [Kenntnisgabe]: entertaining, relating, reporting, arranging. The linguistic expression is very often factically disjointed, incomplete, but all the more characteristic. What is decisive, however, is what is meant in that which is expressed and the how of that which is meant—and those are always the bearings of meaningfulness, whose context founds itself from out of the flowing context of expectation of factical life. In the bearings of meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeitsverhalte], the meaningfulness is still there. The relationship, the bearing, is not a bearing of matters [Sachverhalt] and is not meant as such, but rather a bearing of life [Lebensverhalt]-the tendency of pressing forward with its horizons plays therein. In the context of meaningfulness, no order is objectively experienced, in the sense of the special order of lawfulness of the material contents.3 It is not the pure bearings of matters that serve as the benchmarks and guidelines for the unities of taking-notice and its expression, but rather the factically experienced contents of meaningfulness in their historical context, founded by their sense of facticity. Every explication is subordinate to a guiding idea. The explication of taking-notice is motivated in each case by the prevailing tendency of expectation and


88 BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY


Basic Problems of Phenomenology - Winter Semester 1919-1920 (GA 58) by Martin Heidegger