New translation
Hölderlin's Hymn "Remembrance"
Martin Heidegger
Translated by William McNeill and Julia IrelandWinter semester 1941-42 lecture course on Friedrich Hölderlin's hymn, "Remembrance".
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The viewer, as preserver and participant, is there with the images and what is depicted in and through an attuned mode of dwelling in the midst of the image, Being-in the midst of the world the images open and establish.
[H]orizon functions as that openness toward closure that moves Dasein by opening and bounding the limited expanse that is Dasein’s very Being.
Glancing forward to Heidegger’s take for a clue, we read that “Da-‐sein expends itself primarily for itself as a being that is concerned about its being, whether explicitly or not. Initially and for the most part, care is circumspect taking care of things. Expending itself for the sake of itself, Da-‐sein ‘uses itself up’.” That account emphasizes the experience of ongoing dissipation.
Reexamining the relationship between using proper-ly and using up will help to address the wider problem of whether beings in Heidegger’s ontology can affect each other, mutually shaping each other’s identity (or peculiarity), which is the central theme in Heidegger’s oeuvre.
Heidegger, in his work of the 1920s and beyond, will in effect inaugurate a new thinking of possibility that will exceed the parameters set by the first, Greek beginning of philosophy, which became established in Aristotle’s ontology.
The analytic moment (μαθών) aims at showing
how ex-sistence is the Open (cf. SZ I.1-2)
what ex-sistence as the Open does (cf. SZ I.3).
In four phases and with reference to Husserl, Heidegger interpreted Kant as first falling short of phenomenology (1919-1925), then approaching phenomenology (1925-1927), then advancing phenomenology (1927-1929), and finally again approaching phenomenology (1930 and after).
As essentially related to being, attention is the abyssal ground for all modes of human engagement, be they walking, talking, reflecting, etc. Its movement is the very movement of our being, which is how we participate in the being of all that is.
Contributors:
On Sheehan’s interpretation whenever Heidegger claims “It is not we who ...” he’s not implying “It is that weird thing over there which ...” Instead Heidegger is referring to the Dasein im Mensch, the existential-structural openedness in people, a structural component we may experience, if we do, as something ‘other.’
In Heidegger’s argument, time cannot be said to be constituted by the subject, as existentially reinterpreted temporality constitutes the very sensibility of Dasein’s being from the unchosen thrownness of birth to the inappropriable facticity of death, which indicates two occasions that define human Dasein while defying the meaning and sense-making activities of the subject.
Through this Destruktion, then, we can discover the history of ontology as a series of responses to Heidegger’s formulation of the question of the meaning of Sein. This indicates Heidegger’s novelty as seemingly the first philosopher since Plato and Aristotle to have brought forth this question in the first place, or at least to have made the question appear in this way.
In Heidegger’s thought, since DASEIN is his own possibility, we can never speak of him as something completed, something stable or fixed. DASEIN never quite is. He is constantly realizing his possibilities.
Thus, in keeping with Augustine, Heidegger defines “time” as “the fact that I am dis-closed.”163 But along with this “distance,” human being also “returns to” (i.e., remains with) itself and the things it encounters as it renders them meaningfully present in terms of one or another possibility.
I can no longer google the link to the original PDF.
The question as to whether your philosophy is or is not Ex-istenzphilosophie matters rather little to me.— In a sense, Plato’s philosophy is Existenzphilosophie. The death of a man who is Socrates, and his existence, is at the center.
In terms of the concept we started with, these disparate forms of being which happen to individuals (and groups) are the polyethism characteristic of human being. Both Brooks and Heidegger hold out the prospect of mokṣa, release bondage to this delusory, labile ‘fleeing.’
The task of the histōr is to make the death intelligible as ___ and to show that some or another remedy thus ‘makes sense.’ If that can be accomplished then the breakdown, the neikos, may be repaired and the polis maintain its peace a while longer.
Do we need an alternative to presence as an understanding of being? If not, why not? If so, why, and what could the alternative be?
This book aims to be an accessible but serious 'general introduction' to Being and Time as a whole; the intended reader is a 'novice', for everyone newly confronted with Heidegger lacks much of the background necessary to 'put together' a full conception of what he is saying.
The resultant conceptual description is Dasein (human)-made theoretical constructs of a certain universe of activities. The construction explains a machine (the grand diagram), its slices and how its things behave, and their flows and submachines that are inside a definite enclosure or in the Heideggerian language a certain gathering.
[Heidegger at Zollikon] goes on to discuss the way science works, all of which he also and already has laid out in Being and Time, but which he here states more plainly and we could call this the articulation par excellence, and pace Richardson, of a Heideggerian philosophy of science which also happens to look a great deal like other philosophies of science
Heidegger is adamantly ‘essentialist’ on this point. Whatever it was or is – Einbruch, Ereignis, or whatnot – every natural process of differentiation is excluded; in addressing the human difference naturalism is the error of biologism
Heidegger is setting up a distinction between two types of technē. The first is a lower form of technē, which is unable to overcome Vorhandenheit (or presence-at-hand). ... The second is “great technē,” which sets-into-work being itself as unconcealment.
The positioning of education, the thing-ing, was rampant in Heidegger’s time as it is today and it may be for this reason that Heidegger leaves those who follow his thought with much to ponder.
The challenge is not just to interpret Heidegger, but to think and act today.
The Heideggerian notion of “In the World Being”, could provide, in the right context, an idle fire escape for some burning questions of the Neurosciences.
Even if one claims the event of transformation as a complex unity of same-difference; Ereignis functions as 'more than' structure, it is the happening of what happens to a being.
Heidegger always preserves the phenomenological correlation between whatever is open/intelligible and the apprehending of what is open/intelligible. So, on the one hand, the kind of disclosedness of things is their meaningful (not just their sensible) disclosedness, and this occurs not off by itself in some pre- or extra-human scenario but only in and with the human apprehension of those thingsOriginal PDF
Philosophy is the getting-going of the going out, over, and beyond the whole of beings that lies at the basis of Dasein.
So the existential constitution of the ‘Da’ — the phenomenon of Entdecktheit, ‘discoveredness’ — has two principal components (if that phrase be permitted) — Befindlichkeit (‘disposedness,’ ‘state-of-mind’) and Verstehen (‘understanding’); roughly, the basis of affectivity and the basis of cognition. These two existentials are equiprimordial and co-occurrent: state-of-mind is never without understanding and understanding always has its mood.
[T]he blank spaces introduced between the letters of ‘E i n’ enable us to resist Heidegger’s powerful reading that claims the supposed unicity of ‘E i n Geschlecht’ as the necessary condition for ‘saving the earth’ from a ‘degenerate’ Geschlecht that will not survive the internal diremption between Geschlechter.
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New translation
Winter semester 1941-42 lecture course on Friedrich Hölderlin's hymn, "Remembrance".
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According to Carpenter, the Inuit’s conception of space and time is a unity (this is reflected in the Inuit word tima, which means, “here-now” and of each situation as a ‘dynamic process’. This resonates with Heidegger’s view that space and time form a unity that is delivered over to historical agents by way of the giving characteristic of appropriation (Ereignis).
Heidegger's review of his time as rector takes neither the form of an apology nor a straightforward defense but was written as an indictment within a conspiracy theory that he can finally only explain in spiritual terms.
Just as Schreber in his madness always insisted he did not choose to become God’s woman – it wasn’t his idea – so Heidegger’s recurring expression ‘it is not we who ...’ characterizes our openness as in some sense the ‘obediential potency’ of sense-making, the passive middle point of meaning: “We never come to thoughts. They come to us.”
A failure to appreciate this very basic hermeneutic point—that, for Heidegger, ontotheology explains technological nihilism—continues to undermine sympathetic as well as critical treatments of Heidegger's views on technology
I will speak, therefore, of a word. Of the simplest of words, and the most significant. ... I will speak of the simple word ‘is.’ Which, in two brief letters, carries the whole burden of the ‘meaning’ or ‘sense’ of B/being in the Western metaphysical languages. But which scarcely exists, and is often not spoken or written except as the meaningless sibilant: ’s.
has published
Restores philosophical balance to the debate.
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Heidegger’s god is not a god that we need, a god that we call on to answer our questions, so much as it is a god who needs us, a god who calls on us to play our part in the grounding of a meaningful world.
The faculty for shifting paradigms and the faculty for modifying self-interpretation are the same – insight. Heidegger repeatedly insists on the primacy of insight; in the first instance for the necessary changeover from the ‘natural attitude’ to phenomenology
We contend that the comic is an articulation of technological and aesthetic revealing: the intersection of the totalising ‘danger’ of technology and the ‘saving power’ of art.
What Heidegger’s concept of Dasein’s helps to illuminate is the projective character of the viewer. In Heideggerian terms, it is the viewer, by virtue of Dasein’s de-distancing, projective character who traverses the “distance” to what is depicted on screen.
has published
Engages with the depth and breadth of Heidegger’s work as it opens space for a discussion about the uniqueness of human consciousness.
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Sheehan is not content with the mere rebuttal of the mistaken hypostatization of being or the firm establishment of the alternative thesis of the foundational correlativity of man and being. In fact, Sheehan argues for a much more radical and, it must be said, much more contestable position, namely that, contrary to the received view, being as such is not really Heidegger’s main topic at all.
Fundamental to Being and Time is the manifestation of this thematic pair in Dasein: das Man as the exploitative pole, the anticipatorily resolute self as the exploratory. Which brings us back to the contrast of principled with an-archic freedom.
It is because of the inherently intentional dimensionality of consciousness that we are able to become our machines, that we can become, as a military unit does, to use a familiar and very military metaphor, like a well-oiled machine because we project ourselves into our machines: our machines, our selves. Thus Heidegger focuses on Machenschaft, mechanization, a can-do-ability along with gigantization in his Contributions to Philosophy, including his reflections on the last god, including his fugues, all very much in the sense that Ernst Jünger would speak of Titan-Technik, that is to say, literally titanic technology.
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Shifts of themes and concepts in Heidegger’s non-public writings from 1936 to 1941.
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Heidegger's inconspicuous and the religious experience through French phenomenologists.
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If freedom is understood as a foundation, if yet in its abysmal character, then we recognize a repetition of the aspirations of German idealism, to create a system of freedom, where freedom functions as a first principle. But Heidegger’s aspiration already at this point should be read as directed elsewhere, toward freedom as the opening toward that which is,
Movies themselves play a part in the drama of human self-revelation in that their making exhibits the florid exuberance of the as-structure. The phenomenon of the ‘as,’ Heidegger says, is “the structure that belongs to understanding as such.”
Dasein’s characteristic niche-making forms a colossal heat engine; in its engagement with nature the peculiar process of ‘projection,’ ‘taking-as,’ entwurfen etwas auf/als etwas, which we essentially are, produces entropy. Ereignis then designates the biosphere’s discontinuous transition (Einbruch) to this new kinetic regime of self-structured disordering.
If we are to get some appreciation of how Heidegger, or a Heideggerian, would look upon Marilyn Monroe's experience of the "world," we must begin by asking how the notion of world became problematic for Heidegger in the first place.
Contributors:
Heidegger’s attitude is stratospheric; he is ready to dismiss all the variety of technological relationships as inessential in comparison to the supposed essence of the phenomenon.
The zuhanden-vorhanden dynamic can be read as simply the gateway for overcoming presentism and objectivism, as a starting-point that counter-poses practical usage to theoretical examination, wherein usage opens up different and more original philosophical concepts.
Although the early state did not invent slavery it did invent, in response to the demands of administration, a new technology: literacy; a technology which more than any other instantiates positionality.
The logic of the thought which reasons the truth of the being is the logic of silence, that is, sygetics. It is not merely an isolated logic of silence. Sygetics points to the essence of language.
For Heidegger, beyond the conviction that we can get technology in hand, coupled with our ever greater confidence in techno-neutrality, a conviction, he tells us already in his first essay on technology, "delivers us over to it in the worse possible way."
For Heidegger, doctors who "think" are more than technicians. They question the assumptions of the natural sciences, make a concerted effort to situate the sufferer within his or her life-world, and attend to their unique experiences and self-interpretations.
Despite Arendt’s avowing to Heidegger that The Human Condition “owes practically everything to you in every respect,” one thing it clearly didn’t owe to Heidegger, thankfully, was any sense that modernity, for all its discontents and frustrations, is utterly irredeemable. For Heidegger, the work of art redeems us insofar as it helps to conduct us back to a radically pre-modern world where Being still speaks to us through the medium of “things” in their “thinghood” or “thingliness,” as it were. A rustic jug or a peasant’s pair of work-boots are authentic “things” whereas most of what we handle as benighted moderns is corrupted by modernity’s alienation from Being.
After its fashion the Shimmer-generator is casting-forth a world by its rapid recombination of DNA resulting in an ecosystem quite alien to the native. With or without intentionality the Shimmer-generator is projecting a new world. The Shimmer-generator thus has broken through our ambit of sense, Umkreis, and irrupted into being-in-the-world; imposing its own radically other ‘sense.’
The radicality of Heidegger’s later position on Being as physis as aletheia lies, then, in this: Being is not strictly speaking dependent upon the human being as the site or dative, the “to-whom,” of Being’s unending temporal emergence and unconcealedness.
The Right Heideggerians claim Ereignis is “just another name” for “Being,” but they are unable to explain what Ereignis means and why it has to be the thing itself. Instead they keep repeating their now expanded mantra, ̓Αλήθεια = Φύσις = “Being” = die Sache selbst = Ereignis! Contrary to the Latin maxim rem tene, verba sequentur, they cling to these sacrosanct terms as precious gifts from the Master Himself.
Responding to Kris McDaniel's The Fragmentation of Being
The ceremonial purpose of legislative prayer is to commandeer the divine and position it in the regime of orderable resource as backing, ground, warrant, legitimation for lawmaker's actions.
Basically what Heidegger does not understand is that there are things about ourselves that were always true that we only later discover about ourselves, and that is wisdom to understand the self in such depth as to realize what it actually is like behind the semblances. Heidegger’s Dasein cannot discover what it always was and always will be, its Arche: origin and end as the same.
In response to external-world scepticism, Heidegger launched a phenomenological inquiry into the basic ways in which a cognising subject experiences its relation to the world. He conceptualised this experience in existential terms as an experience of ‘being-in-the-world.’ On Heidegger’s account, the most basic form of being-in-the-world is an experience of immersed involvement in a world of work. The epistemological problem of how the subject gains access to an external world is neutralised once one recognises that subject and world were never separated in the first place.
If Heidegger will eventually claim that animals have no world, not even an Umwelt, his earlier lecture courses show that this constitutes a reversal in his way of thinking.
What is inaccessible to thinking must therefore be absolutely excluded from the sphere of intelligibility. It follows that being/intelligibility as such must be completely and perfectly self-identical, self-sufficient, and unitary, safeguarded from any interaction with and from any reference to a nonintelligible outside or other of intelligible being-there. This is the core insight of Parmenides’ way of ἀλήθεια, of intelligible evidence, which is also the way of ἔστιν—understood in the subjectless and absolute sense of “there is.”
Translated by Pete Ferreira
Heidegger's thought represents a dense stitching of Aristotle's presence in our century. It does not give us a simple interpretation of Aristotle, but enacts a radical attempt at renewal with an invigorating understanding of the fundamental problems which for the first time are grasped in Aristotle's text and shown to Western thought.
The continuity of the color spectrum, becoming present in the artwork, interrupts any conceptual classification of the leaves—in, say, a yellow, maybe an orange, and a green kind. The peculiar arrangement of the leaves, their sculpting or setting-up as a work, highlights these colors, makes them “glow,” Heidegger would have said, but it does not reveal any organization according to genus and species nor even a countable number of instances of the same kind.
The question then becomes: What is this Open or clearing itself, if we disregard the fact that “the side turned towards us” can also appear as the horizon of our presentational thinking? How is the clearing itself opened up?
New from Rowman & Littlefield
The first single-author monograph that takes up Heidegger’s relevance to film.
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There was nothing ‘‘open’’ about Heidegger’s passionate relationshipwith Arendt, and precious little in the long succession of affairs that followed.Instead, the fact that Heidegger was (rather nobly) raising as his own son a boy(Hermann) whom Elfride had conceived in an earlier love affair of her own seems tohave given Heidegger something of a lifelong ‘‘Get out of jail free’’ card (or, moreaccurately, a ‘‘Get out of Jail without a divorce’’ card), and one he played with afrequency that tormented Elfride.
Heidegger’s entire path of thinking can be understood—as he himself suggests on more than one occasion—as preparing the way for what he calls “the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian World”. And so, while many readers of Heidegger may be satisfied to focus on this or that text or period, this or that issue or step on his path, those who pursue the entire trajectory of his thinking will eventually find themselves faced with the inevitability of this dialogue.
Heidegger is hardly alone in being subject to this, if his circumstances do outclass other scholarly scandals. Philosophy is thus just what every textbook about philosophy suggests: a list of names for popular consumption. The great philosopher is identifiable by a Google or Twitter ranking. Maybe just, more soberly, by citation frequency.
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Therefore, we can correctly say – where “correctly” means “in accordance with the intention of all his work” – that Heidegger’s efforts as a whole were directed towards knowing and embracing the facticity that we essentially are. To state those moments in classical Greek terms: first, “γνῶθι σεαυτόν” and then “γένοι’ οἷος ἐσσι μαθών”
The setting of Being into what appears as beings (in das Erscheinende als das Seiende) is the operation of the as-structure; taking-as is the technology of Dasein’s world-forming. The hand, says Aristotle, is the tool of tools. Taking-as, for Heidegger, is the technē of technai. (But not, he will insist, the essence of technology; technē remains ‘technological.’)
Being is the pure emerging of all that emerges (physis). Being is the pure manifesting of all that is manifest (aletheia). Being is the pure laying-out and gathering of all that is (the primordial Logos). This understanding of Being, although already in evidence in the early work, came into fullest view in his “later” writings and reflections.
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The work of Ernst Jünger and its effect on the development of Martin Heidegger’s influential philosophy of technology
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If Wittgenstein were permitted just one critique of Heidegger’s account of the Ereignis, it would likely be that Heidegger too has been seduced by language. For even though Heidegger acknowledges the limits of language, he continues to violate those limits because “[I]n so far as people think they can see the limits of human understanding, they believe of course that they can see beyond these”. Specifically, Wittgenstein might well say that Heidegger description of the opening of an Open, a “world” in which beings can be present, is simply a mythological way of referring to the “world” of meaning.
Heidegger's concept of the Earth and world can be seen as a new conceptualization of matter and form, in which the original power of the definition of the terms matter and form is rehabilitated from the perspective of the world of practice we are always already intentionally involved in.Also available now:
and
with
Forthcoming in Techné.
So Freud’s conception of a topographical separation suggests the image of the clearing and the unconscious as each the attractor fundamental to its respective realm. Or, echoing Boss now, that each is a focus, like the mutualistic pair in the Lorenz ‘butterfly,’ of the single chaotic attractor that is human sense-making. The Freudian unconscious is then the co-ordinate second situs of ontology, the other clearing.
We can understand Being in this context as the self-withdrawing basis for the presencing, gathering, and ordering of beings, which must be heeded. What is key is that for Heidegger, we can participate more or less fully in this gathering; for it is not a collection of objects, or a highest genus, but rather essentially involves effort and force, which is characterized in terms of a standing and holding that holds beings in readiness, a stillness in which things are held in a tension.
[O]bject-oriented ontology establishes the domain of philosophy as a province of indifference, and anywhere that Heidegger would broach the subject of Dasein’s care or responsibility, any sign of a relation between the philosopher and the object of philosophy, Harman must convert such traces of philosophical praxis into an ontological logic to which Dasein has no significant relation. Object-oriented ontology thus entails the duplicitous thesis that the philosopher is indifferent to the object of philosophy.
Two recent papers from
[T]here is a depth to every “thing” that cannot be exhausted by the word, even the poet’s word. Every being is always more than what we can say or think about it; every being is always more—it exceeds or overflows—sense or meaning.
and
[T]he essential unfolding of kosmos/world/Being is structurally and temporally prior to the gods and human beings and in no way dependent on them.
The Alltäglichkeit in Being and Time and its outriders is the proto‐version of the Ge-stell in Heidegger's post‐war corpus. The everyday comportment of Dasein scaled up to higher levels of organization shows up in the later work as positionality, das Ge-‐stell, "the essence of technology."
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A proper return to myth and art as a means by which the transcendental realities that constitute the phenomenology of our embodied existence may be better understood, and also the means by which we may come to truly dwell.
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Heidegger thus sees in Dionysus a blending of opposites as well, a coexistence of contradiction, even that between presence and absence. For this reason, he is the god of neither presence nor absence, Dionysus is the god of the trace, of that which lies “between” presence and absence.
[I]t is Heidegger's allegiance to reunification-within-the-origin which is most distressful-and most demanding of deconstruction. The same allegiance is revealed in the continual Heideggerian recourse to words prefixed by 'ge-', which connotes a gathering or grouping: e.g., Geviert, ge-eignet, Ge-stell, Gemiit, Gedichtnis, Geschick
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Winter semester 1925 lecture course on the meaning of truth in psychologism, Aristotle, and Kant.
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In thinking about the being of the entities discovered in the sciences, we do not think about something else. Being is not itself an entity, but only the disclosure of entities as intelligible. Philosophical reflection would not take us away from the subject matter of the sciences, but would instead aim to bring one back afresh to “the things themselves” in their essential disclosedness.
Summoning her out of her loop, her programming, Alltäglichkeit. “All lives have routines, mine’s no different,” she says. She regularly recites the script of her Grundstimmung, her fundamental attunement: “Some people choose to see the ugliness in this world. I choose to see the beauty. To believe there is an order to our days, a purpose.” But Dolores did not make that choice, it was programmed into her, a literal Stimmung, a calibration; it’s part of her thrown constitution, Geworfenheit.
When an object is “ready to hand”, it becomes the exact opposite of explicit knowledge with various attributes that must be consciously grasped: More like a hammer in use by a skilled carpenter or a screen when a programmer is debugging, the tool itself becomes invisible by virtue of being thoroughly integrated into the practical activity itself. It was this insight that ended up transforming AI and machine learning more than any other insight from Heidegger, even if the insight was perhaps altered beyond recognition to Heidegger himself in transmission.
Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s concept of holding-to-be-true is a necessary condition for the “original stance of inquiry of philosophy”, because only in a philosophical questioning that is characterized by faith as holding-to-be-true, the “truth of being” can originally resonate.
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Translated by Ullrich Haase and Mark Sinclair
Seminar winter semester 1940-39 (GA 46).
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“Occurrence” is an appropriate translation of the word Zusammenvorkommen in Heidegger’s phrase “Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte,” but as a translation of Geschehen in Hei-degger’s determination of Geschick (“occurrence [Geschehen] of the community [der Ge-meinschaft], of {the} people [des Volkes]” it is probably too pale (Macquarrie and Robinson have “historizing”).
The withdrawal of things from all access is not some quirky existential/psychological feature of humans, but infects even the most rudimentary forms of inanimate causation. Veiling and unveiling are ubiquitous: even between billiard balls, even between fire and cotton, and even when humans are not observing, do not yet exist, or exist no longer.
[T]hrown-open or appropriated ex-sistence, as the clearing, is responsible for all forms of the meaningful presence (the being) of things. Es gibt Sein because Ereignis gibt Sein, that is: The reason why there is “being” (the meaningful presence of something) at all is that the appropriation of ex-sistence to its proprium as the clearing makes that possible.
Time-space takes on a particularly privileged role in the Beiträge, as "originally the site for the moment of propriation [Augenblicks-Staätte des Ereignisses]". Although this is perhaps more important for Heidegger scholarship than for geography, we should note that this is the way to understand the notion of Da-sein, as "the site for the moment of the grounding of the truth of beyng".
James Bahoh Larry Berger Robert Bernasconi Peg Birmingham Scott Campbell Richard Capobianco Daniel Dahlstrom Sean Driscoll Jessica S. Elkayam Jesús Adrián Escudero Gregory Fried Wayne Froman Jennifer Gammage Matthew Girson Rico Gutschmidt Peter Hanly Rebecca Longtin Hansen Lawrence Hatab Julia Ireland Khafiz Kerimov Theodore Kisiel Adam Knowles María del Rosario Acosta López Brendan Mahoney Eduardo Mendieta Andrew J. Mitchell Ian Moore David Nowell-Smith David Pettigrew Richard Polt Jeffrey Powell François Raffoul Joel Reynolds Karen Robertson Elizabeth Rottenberg John Sallis Thomas Sheehan Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback Dennis Skocz Peter Trawny Daniela Vallega-Neu Kate Withy David Wood
Arab philosophers read Heidegger as a critic of metaphysics in and through language and they, in addition, go beyond this by applying it in the frame of their own philosophical projects.
[W]e can say that Enframing does not primarily concern the content [Gehalt] of phenomena called human-technology relations, but concerns a relation [Bezug] that we already enact [Vollzug] in encountering these phenomena. Understood on this ontological level, Enframing means a reciprocal setting-upon [stellen] of being and thinking with regard to function, which is technical inasmuch as utility marks the main trait of the horizon toward which all experiential correlations are oriented.