Being is always disclosed to such falling – hence the ontological being is always concerned with falling and always falling itself. Tota vita—tentatio; all life is falling.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Bremen Lectures "The Thing" | 5 |
| Heraclitus | 110 |
| Being and Truth | 35 |
| The Beginning of Western Philosophy | 70 |
| Early Greek Thinking "Aletheia (Heraclitus, Fragment B 16)" | 102 |
| Being and Time | 22 |
| Pathmarks "What is Metaphysics?" | 120 |
| The Question Concerning Technology | 19 |
| The Principle of Reason | 113 |
| Discourse On Thinking "Memorial Address" | 56 |
| Heraclitus Seminars | 6 |
There are 11 pages because the bottom two tied for 10th place.
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
[Heidegger] laments that what is lacking today is “phenomenological discipline” (which is something else than the discipline of phenomenology), one that is not biased by one or the other philosophical position and lets itself be determined by the claim of the Sache, the matter of thinking.
Beginning means both the one beginning, that is the most originary inceptive occurrence of being in its truth, and the beginning again in a more futural sense, but of a “future,” a coming to be that is already there, but not yet in being.
| Text | Page |
|---|---|
| Wegmarken (GA 9) Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers »Psychologie der Weltanschauungen« (1919/21) | 1 |
| Logik: Die frage nach der Wahrheit (GA 21) WS 1925-26 | 170 |
| Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens (GA 13) Der Feldweg (1949) | 90 |
| Zur Sache des Denkens (GA 14) Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens (1964) | 81 |
| Vorträge und Aufsätze (GA 7) Bauen Wohnen Denken (1951) | 156 |
| Holzwege (GA 5) Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935/36) | 21 |
| Sein und Zeit (Niemeyer) | 250 |
| Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (GA 65) (1936-1938) | 408 |
| Frühe Schriften (GA 1) Nachwort des Herausgebers | 437 |
| Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (GA 4) Vorwort zur Lesung von Hölderlins Gedichten | 195 |
* excluding pages in previous years' top ten.
Owning our emotions is thus not a matter of choosing them but of choosing to let them be what they are, as genuinely disclosive.
In Heidegger's work the Master Signifier of human uniqueness is Ereignis.
Translated by Haralambos Ventis, introduction by Andrew Louth
Heidegger's analysis, although it applies to the western tradition of what Heidegger calls "onto theology", it does not take account of the Orthodox tradition of apophatic theology, of which Dionysius the Areopagite is a pre-eminent example.
[I]t is difficult, at first blush, to understand how, of all people, Trakl—the drug-addled, Austrian expressionist in love with decay and obsessed with his sister—could become for Heidegger the next “poet of the Germans” and take on the role of savior of the German people and indeed of the entire Occident.
Temporally, the notion of the last god is an instantiation of Heidegger’s open circle, the return to the beginning that never was, the genuine iteration of the again that is altogether otherwise.
As event, the Ereignis does not offer itself in any positive manner, but precisely as its own ex- or dispropriation. It events by dis- or deventuating: Ereignis gives only as Enteignis; or there is Ereignis only as Enteignis.
Aletheia meant responsivity between the seer and the seen, a relation of mutual interpenetration: the knowing subject changes its forms of understanding as the known object is resignified.
[C]an this temporal field of a GA perhaps also be understood in the equiprimordial register of truth as unconcealment, such that the “institutional errancy” of family, publishers, editors and translators that in fact has manifested itself in the erratic path of the GA can itself be justified in Heideggerian terms, as what Heidegger himself in fact anticipated?
Heidegger considers not just the human but primordial being (or beyng) itself to be finite. Indeed, according to Fink, this is what distinguishes Heidegger’s philosophy from that of all of his predecessors.
I think for Heidegger and the question of technology, it's not so much that technology is either a good or a bad thing, it's just the way that metaphysics has distorted the essence of technology or occluded it, so that we don't quite get to its essence.
Nothing stands in the way of the final possibility that for Dasein the only issue left becomes ordering for the sake of order itself.
Face-to-face with its own being, Dasein’s uncanny feeling is not just a sense of being “not-at-home,” it is also a sense of this strangeness being itself at the heart of one’s own existence.
Of the two versions of the ontological difference, metaphysical and phenomenological, only the latter allows for an adequate understanding of the referential character of symbols (in symbols a first, apparent meaning refers to a second, hidden meaning which is explored through practice).
Heidegger's insight disclosed to him that the Dasein in human being is nothing human.
Philosophy is the getting-going of the going out, over, and beyond the whole of beings that lies at the basis of Dasein.
Heidegger’s metaphysical grounding of logic supports Langer’ contention that art is not opaque and ineffable simply because it cannot be projected into propositional form.
The clearing is an opening lighting center beyond beings that encircles all that is akin to the barely known nothing.
Grasping the truth of the situation, I see how what I am doing here and now is what is to be done as an action worth doing for itself, and that insight is constitutive of its product, πρᾶξις.
Are we, today, in touch with time as history? Are we capable of asking who we are, not just what we are? Are we open to the arrival of what is our own? Or do we continue to be absorbed in representing, producing, and reproducing what is present?
The significance Heidegger finds in his words, and Emerson and Thoreau find in theirs, is remarkable enough; but that in the face of this significance, to discover that their thoughts are intimately, endlessly related, has become for me unforgettably interesting.
Authenticity would thus be tied, not to adherence to some determinate inner 'truth', but rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the 'event' of appropriation – an openness to the happening of place.
As Plotinus, Heidegger, and Lacan have said, you have to give what you don’t have. If you give what you have, you’re not giving.
Heidegger's Christian heritage includes the theme of the Fortunate Fall—”Yet all our honey in that poyson grewe”—and he uses its analog the Fortunate Breakdown to think in accordance with philosophy's inveterate norm of imparting good news, or inventing it.
[L]ooking at Heidegger in light of an anti-sceptical reading of Wittgenstein and looking at Wittgenstein in light of Heidegger’s problematic of authenticity
The key to us having a free relationship to modern technology rests, Heidegger proposes, on our experiencing it as a legacy and our role within it. Experiencing it in these ways keeps us in the free space of it, which by no means locks us “into a numb coercion” of “blindly” pursuing technology or “helplessly” raging against it and condemning it as the work of the devil.
No one ‘lives in the moment’ according to Heidegger’s reckoning. Intelligent beings stretch out in time, caught between birth and death: we live between.
[I]n Adorno’s view, Heidegger is more concerned with primordial possibility than with the real possibility of emancipation, which is suppressed by existing conditions.
Heideggerian authenticity and mindfulness would involve a rehabilitation of the Stoic idea of oikeiōsis, as is revealed for example by the homology between oikeiōsis and Befindlichkeit, where both non-conceptually disclose the organism’s constitution to itself.
[T]his neutrality is never in fact neutral, acting as a disguise that erases sexual difference and femininity in favor of a surreptitious phallogocentrism Derrida finds Heidegger guilty of [...]
Heidegger was highly attentive to his own reputation and was a master at self-representation, yet we should not allow ourselves to be distracted by Heidegger’s own sleight of hand.
We, as sexed bodies, are responsible for the throwness (that forms the past) of Dasein.
Heidegger appropriates Aristotle’s texts on ethics, politics, rhetoric, and psychology for the purposes of his analysis of factical life, so that neither ethics nor politics as such define his interpretive angle, which remains quintessentially ontological.
[O]nce one recognizes the technological understanding of being for what it is—a historical understanding—one gains a free relation to it.
We can also think of the respective determinations of deliverance as two poles of a continuously varying ontological reaction norm (contour of the individual capacity for taking-as, for ex-sistence, eigenen Seinkönnen): one the extreme of safety-seeking (stability, predictability, order, equilibrium, harmony, shelter) and the other of risk-seeking (self-creation, Solon's flowers of folly, Schiller's Spieltrieb, Schürmann's ‘singular,' the later Heidegger's an-archie)
New book
[Heidegger] offers an extraordinary vision of the place of the human being in the cosmos, which calls for the practice of acute and steadfast attentiveness, thus providing a standpoint that transcends traditional political oppositions.
[A]lthough Heidegger identifies an originary ontological indeterminateness and points out that this manifests itself ontically through an immanent process of auto-expression, he insists that ontic analyzes of sexuality must be specific to each concrete Dasein and thought in relation to the open-ended becoming that each Dasein is.
[U]nlike Heidegger — who, as we have seen, places all human movements in the category of the concept of gesture — Flusser reserves this term only for a specific kind of movement.
[I]f the world is intelligible upon the basis of this “public one,” it is correct to say that Dasein is not neutral, but rather marked for gender in a patriarchal order.
Galileo’s most important insight, according to Heidegger, is that he saw that in order to experimentally examine nature, you first need to have a conception of nature that underlies all your experiments.
[T]he treatment succeeds because the truth it seeks is the truth of revelation (ἀλήθεια) which is self-validating to the extent that the e-vidence for evidence is e-vidence. As a liberating from darkness (λήθη), this truth is essentially freedom, and freedom of this kind comes to pass through the functioning of language.
This void must be filled. But for Heidegger, attempting to fill it at all, especially by some human self-assertion is itself an expression of nihilism.
It is not that we don’t recognize differences between human beings, machines, and “lifeless nature” or whatever; rather, it is that we act in such a way that those differences finally do not matter.
Malabou transforms Heidegger’s hierarchical binaries of the history of being and metaphysics, ἀλήθεια and ὀρθότης, concealing and revealing, into a ‘general economy of […] mutability’ that, she believes, governs through and through Heidegger’s thinking and is itself based on an ‘ontological metabolism’ that produces ‘changes, mutations, and transformations’.
Heidegger’s own point was that what is in question – this is for him the «danger» – is nothing other than our increasing inability to raise any question at all, let alone critical questions regarding technology.
Heidegger’s lectures on Schelling coincide with his efforts to think being as the self-concealing yet revealing event between humans and God, in which the contest between a recalcitrant earth and a malleable world is waged.
It is a kind of overlapping between Marx's late texts and those of Heidegger's with regard to their respective assessments of the modern epoch: the epoch of the bourgeois-capitalist form of society on the one hand, and the technical age on the other
Proudhon, Bakunin, Saurin—they are all pseudo-anarchists or anarchists only in name. For, according to Schürmann, they fail to exit the metaphysical field
Marcuse diverges from Heidegger in arguing that the congruence of science, technology and society is ultimately rooted in the social requirements of capitalism and the world it projects.
The Net of Indra is not embedded in pre-existent, absolute space; rather, spatial relation is an effect within the Net of Indra.
No common trait or strategy leads from the rule of subsumption to the freedom of the event. This is why, to understand being as Ereignis, a leap is required.
[T]here are good reasons for drawing a strong connection between Aristotle’s ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια and Heidegger’s later guiding-word for being, namely, Ereignis.
[T]o write it down in the service of a systematized or scripted curriculum, with the requisite set “lesson-plans,” already betrays Heidegger’s point about one of the things that makes Socrates the purest thinker of the West, namely, “he wrote nothing,” and if he would have attempted to do so, he would have turned away from authentic thought.
What if sexual difference were already marked in the opening up of the question of the sense of Being and of the ontological difference?
Geschlecht III is, then, arguably Derrida’s most frontal and incisive Auseinandersetzung with Heidegger, a German word often translated as “encounter,” but that Derrida hears in the more polemical sense of confrontation
In Broken Hegemonies, [Schürmann] goes further, arguing that anarchy, another name for finitude, has a double principle, natality and mortality, which leaves us in a double bind insofar as natality and mortality are always undoing each other: mortality is the undertow that undoes every new beginning.
Perhaps the best way of describing angst, which captures what Heidegger needs from it methodologically, is as an ‘epiphany’ (in the Christian sense) or ‘apocalypse’ (in the Greek sense).
What unfolds as Ereignis is presence itself, i.e. our standing in, and simultaneously reflecting on, the open.
Heidegger says that Angst ‘does not know' what it's anxious about.
[M]usic will belong to thought precisely in such a way as to preclude its becoming an object of that thought.
The problem as [Heidegger] sees it is not that we have a decent philosophy of language but have missed something else.
Does not the heideggerian analysis amount to saying that the fall into everydayness is useful, pragmatically necessary, but "immoral"?
Being is something that happens to us rather than something we do, even autonomically. This, along with the dynamic connotation, is why he comes to use the term Ereignis: being manifesting itself is an event in which we are caught up rather than an act we perform.
[T]he appropriation of historical Being in the Ereignis does not denote the forceful, willful taking possession of Being, in the sense of usurping something. Rather, in the Ereignis, it is Being that takes possession of us.
Technological language is thus the language of inauthenticity. It is the modern technological Gerede. Cyber-talk is idle talk.
[L]anguage adjusts to the needs of our experience of what is.
[T]here can be no doubt whatsoever that Heidegger held these notebooks to be intellectually significant—something which, considering their thoroughgoing banality, is for me not merely surprising but actually horrifying.
Once he saw that Husserl’s breakthrough regarding the categorial intuition had already been anticipated by Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, 10, Heidegger had a new insight, one that launched him on his lifelong pursuit of “the thing itself.” He saw that movement determines meaning.
With a response from Richard Polt.
[A]s opposed to an event in the history of Western metaphysics (onto-theology) linked to Plato’s philosophy, for Detienne, it is actually the poet Simonides of Ceos (c. 556–468 BC) who is among those chiefly responsible for the devaluation of alētheia.
Derrida thinks of Heidegger's notion of appropriation—Ereignis but also authenticity, Eigentlichkeit—a virtuous pretense residually connected to the Judeo-Christian, or Abrahamic, faith.
As it is a letting of beings appear in their being, so the granting of the openness of beings in and through language is a letting of beings into their 'own', into what is proper to them, but as such it is also into a letting of beings into their proper 'relation' with one another – both as together and apart.
Anders’ questioning project of the meaning of having with respect to both Being and the body is not only phenomenologico-ontological but aesthetico-epistemological: concerned with appearance, quite specifically with feigning of fictions, illusion.
[I]t is not that Theaetetus’ answer should be assimilated to empiricism and rejected on such grounds, but rather that this answer assimilates unhiddenness to presence (what-is-present, phantasia) to the point where the two terms become identical.
Withy's intervention keeps Tomlinson's book off phenomenology's Index of Wrong-headed Research so that we may avail ourselves of whatever light his effort sheds on die Sache selbst. For the goal of Tomlinson's work is the same as that of Heidegger's, die Herkunft von Anwesen.
[Heidegger] claims that there is a call of the conscience from a place of uncanniness; a place that is alien to us in our everyday mode of being immersed in the they-self.
Heidegger’s phenomenology is, in no small part, in the business of identifying phenomena that conceal themselves and revealing the fact of that self-concealing.
[T]he priority of beings over beyng, which was already on the way to logical self-assertion in the thinking of the thinkers of the first inception, unleashes the metaphysical destiny of the West and its concurring planetary devastation in the wake of Machenschaft.
[updated]
Ereignis is a German word that has no direct English translation. It is often translated as "event" or "appropriation," but these translations do not capture the full meaning of the term. Ereignis is a central concept in the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and it refers to the event of being.
For Heidegger, being is not a thing or a substance. It is not something that can be known or understood through reason. Being is the ground of all things, and it is that which makes things possible. Ereignis is the event in which being comes into presence. It is the moment when something is revealed as what it is.
Ereignis is not something that happens to us. It is something that we participate in. When we encounter something, we are participating in Ereignis. We are allowing being to come into presence through us. Ereignis is the event of truth. It is the moment when we see things as they really are.
Ereignis is a difficult concept to understand, but it is central to Heidegger's philosophy. It is the event that makes all things possible, and it is the event that allows us to see the truth.
Here are some additional thoughts on Ereignis:
Ereignis is a dynamic event, not a static state. It is always happening, and it is always changing.
Ereignis is not something that we can control. It is something that we can only participate in.
Ereignis is a gift. It is something that is given to us, not something that we earn.
Ereignis is a mystery. We cannot fully understand it, but we can experience it.
Ereignis is a complex and profound concept. It is a concept that has the potential to transform our understanding of the world.
Needs citations.
Translated by
Kaiser-Wihlem Institute. Bibliotheca Hertziana, Rome, April 8, 1936.
What is asked about is that from which beings arise, and that to which they return - the ground and abyss of Beyng.
The ontological determination of Dasein—that is, of the being that we ourselves in each case are—is primarily possibility.
Carlo Michelstaedter from Gorizia, an Italophone Austro-Hungarian citizen of Jewish origins, finished writing his tesi di laurea on October 16th 1910, put a gun to his head the next day, and took his own life.
A side-effect of this longstanding, broad reception is that the field of Heidegger studies is so differentiated, dispersed, and fragmented that it becomes impossible to adjudicate conflicting claims on a purely conceptual level.
Consistent with the methodological recommendations of phenomenology, Pessoa describes the ontic relationality of Dasein in its non-thematizable everydayness.
Heidegger marks this sort of translation with a shift in emphasis. Rather than übersetzen, he writes übersetzen, stressing the first syllable and hence the “over” into which we are to be “placed.”
The insight into the burden of being may also help us see the limitations of the Enlightenment without leaping to the conclusion that it must be completely rejected.
From Time and the Shared World: Heidegger on Social Relations.
Thus Heidegger’s characterization of intentionality avoids both the overly conceptual Searlean reading—in which acting intentionally must involve an explicit awareness of the goal or the satisfaction conditions that it establishes—and Dreyfus’s overly self- less understanding of intentionality, which lacks any sense of agency’s mineness.
If, having somehow finessed the measurement problem, we could model a large random sample of ontological insights by a suitable function, the bulk of the distribution would be – so goes the conjecture – populated by noticings, teen angst, ‘existential angst,’ and midlife crises, whereas breakdowns would be found only in the long tail of rarity.
Heidegger failed to develop this insight and realize that this distress caused by the lack of holy names must take root in the body before it can move towards its fulfilment. The event whereby this distress takes roots in the body is like that of Ereignis, whereby Being enters history.
Heidegger's polysemic reading of the principle of reason solves the problem of contra-diction by saying all three levels of being at once, expressing their Sameness the Same way.
A genuine history of thought, then (or a “history of Being”) would neither celebrate the progress of enlightenment nor bemoan the growing darkness, but would trace the interplay of the clear and the obscure.
Das Ereignis, as the law, is then nothing other than the joining of the unity of the belonging together of φύσις, which grants beings (das Seiende) to rise out of darkness into light, and ἀλήθεια, namely unconcealment as the clearing in which man stands as guardian of the radiance of being (das Sein).
In his analysis of geometry and continuum, an analysis that came after his analysis of comportment, Heidegger tacitly says that Aristotle did not fully develop an existential analytic.
Goodness is not eternal and unchanging, but it is a for-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen). Human beings in the flux of becoming will constantly rendezvous with Being and clear (lichtung) their way up to such Being.
Difference constitutes only one momentum of the Ereignis, against which the event turns the nihilating backdraft of the de-parting beyng.
The πάθη, when they are in the ἕξις of ἀρετή, bring us into contact with the truth about ourselves in our being-there. In that connection, we attain φρόνησις
What Heidegger therefore finds [in Plato's Parmenides] is the decisive insight that seeming belongs to the very essence of truth.
Angst is the direct revelation of the ontological, which disrupts our falling being-amidst-entities.
Martin Heidegger is probably the last of the great letter writers in the history of philosophy. He wrote an estimated 10,000 letters in his life.
The example of Heidegger's Seinsgeschichte shows that the structure of the comic mythos is conserved even under radical refashioning; even after purported destruktion the structure still stands.
Ereignis is a German word that translates to "event" or "appropriation", but Heidegger uses it to refer to his thought of how being occurs in its truth². Heidegger works out this thought between 1936 and 1938 in his second major work, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)². Ereignis names the very core of how Heidegger attempts to think the truth of being in its historicality³. It involves a relationship between humans and the world, in which each being is revealed as having its own essence⁵.
(1) Ereignis: the event of appropriation (Chapter 10).
(2) Daniela Vallega-Neu - Ereignis.
(3) Martin Heidegger in English - Ereignis.
(4) Daniela Vallega-Neu - Ereignis.
(5) Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) | Reviews | Notre Dame.
(6) Heidegger Gesamtausgabe | Ereignis.
Bing confused the citation numerals. It's still in beta.
(September 4, 1935 — February 16, 2023)
Parvis Emad was a world-renowned scholar in continental philosophy and phenomenology, specifically as an educator, interpreter and translator of Martin Heidegger’s writing.
Birth marks my dependence on others, on, in the full meaning of the word, generation.
In the most developed version of his approach, Heidegger addressed the contextualizing interaction between the foreground of presence and the background of non-presence as an event, as “taking-place” (Ereignis).
Meaningfulness is not something one is able to create herself or himself.
Peremption, as paradigmatically shown in Heidegger’s Beiträge, is a post-epochal time in which this differend unfolds as the apocalyptic κένωσις of the historiographic/historical/evental differend between ἀρχαί and anarchy, which is always an-archically at play in the abyssality of the Da.
Thinking is apprehending beings as a whole in their being.
Now one of the four senses ascribed to "being" in Brentano's dissertation on Aristotle is ὃν ὡς ἀληθές "being in the sense of the true."
This focus on plurivocity (πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον: what is said in many ways) is not an empty poking about among isolated word meanings, but rather is the expression of the radical tendency to make the meant objectivity itself accessible and to make available the motive source of its different ways of meaning.
[Heidegger] suggests that by relaxing our sense of the control that we have we may yet be able to let go enough that the technical mastery we seek will not overpower us and will not make us its slave.
Whatever twists and turns his philosophical trajectory took, and regardless of the so-called “turn” (Kehre) that he allegedly carried out in the 1930s, Heidegger never took his eye off Dasein as the central topic of his thinking, including when he focused on Ereignis in the last four decades of his career.
[T]ruth and untruth are re-thought because the ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit) of Dasein is re-thought in terms of the clearing (Lichtung) of Being to which historical man is given over.
Original PDF.
The event of appropriation is nothing “behind” being and time but rather names their appropriation, the event of their coming into their own and in relation to each other.
If recognition of the destruction of the history of ontology leads one to pause in the face of the claim that “Heidegger is the author of Being and Time,” it is a doubt which quickly spreads to other philosophical texts.
Original PDF version.
Heidegger thus sees in Dionysus a blending of opposites as well, a coexistence of contradiction, even that between presence and absence. For this reason, he is the god of neither presence nor absence, Dionysus is the god of the trace, of that which lies “between” presence and absence.
The point to note is that Heideggerian love purports to be distinct from limerence. For the distinctive feature of amour-passion is ‘volo ut sis—the lover of me.' ‘I want to be loved by you' as the song goes.
[T]he articulation of the disclosedness to being of Dasein and Dasein-with in the attunement of freedom enables the meeting, the comportment, of the disclosedness of the understanding and freedom of being for the other in the attunement of love.