sense of authentic being having been taken as the fundamental starting point, the modes of the look and the encountering of the objects of dealings in which these objects are given in terms of their full significance in the environing world (e.g., the being-comfortable of the house, its being-pleasant, being-convenientlylocated, and being-well-lit [ibid., E 2, 1026b8–9]) must appear as a mere being-found-along-with and as ἐγγύς τι μὴ ὄν—ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄνομά τι μόνον [something closely akin to non-being—as if it were a mere name] (ibid., 1026b22, 1026b14). But the fact that Aristotle was able to bring this being-found-along with into relief as a separate sense of being is at the same time the strongest expression of the fact that he did take up the environing world as it is fully experienced, that he did see the sorts of things here that are found along with . . . , only that—and this happened already with the term he used for it—all of this was ontologically interpreted on the basis of the guiding theme of a particular sense of being that had been worked out and refined as the decisive one. For its part, this sense of being had its provenance in the environing world as it is originally given in experience, but then, and this is found even in Aristotle himself, it lost the sense of this provenance due to the pressure exerted by the kind of ontology worked out and refined. In the course of the subsequent development of ontological research, it fell into the averageness of having its vague traditional meaning of “reality” or “actuality” and as such then provided the starting point for the problems of epistemology. The “objectivity” of the theoretical definition of objects in the sense of “nature,” an “objectivity” that in turn first grew out of this starting point for epistemology, then took the lead regarding the problem of the sense of being.