about its dealings. Beings in their basic aspect of being-moved, i.e., their “being out for” and “going toward,” constitute the forehaving and condition that makes it possible for us to bring intentionality into relief in accord with how it becomes explicit in Aristotle and for its part makes visible the basic characteristic of λόγος. We will then for the first time have at our disposal the concrete motivational basis allowing us to understand the final stage that Aristotle reached in the problems of ontology and logic. What this final stage is rooted in will be exhibited in an interpretation of Met. Γ, Ε, Β, and Ι and in an interpretation of De interp., the Prior Analytics, and the Posterior Analytics. What becomes clear on the basis of these interpretations is the extent to which a particular ontology of a particular domain of being and the logic of a particular kind of addressing came to be regarded, in consequence of the inclination toward falling found in interpreting, as the one and true ontology and the one and true logic, and as such came to dominate in a decisive manner not only the history of ontology and logic but also that of spirit itself, i.e., the history of human existence.

The origin of the “categories” does not lie in λόγος as such. Nor are these “categories” read off from “things.” Rather, they are the basic modes of a particular kind of addressing of a particular domain of objects that are maintained in forehaving in terms of their “look” and consist of those objects of dealings one can be concerned with and directed to in terms of routine tasks. As such, they are the “phyla” of the sense of the as-what-characteristics in terms of which these objects are able to be addressed [for this and the following, see Met. Θ 10, Ε 2–4, Δ 7]. They are found together with δυνάμει and ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν [being possible and being actual], since, in growing out of the what of objects and being for it, they are constitutive for the being of objects in the sense of states of “affairs” [“Tuns”- Gegenstände] (ὄν ὡς πρᾶγμα [being in the sense of things]). In contrast, ὄν ὡς ἀληθές [being in the sense of being true], i.e., truth as a characteristic of beings, as the how of their unveiled being-there as they are in themselves, is not constitutive for the πρᾶγμα [thing], and yet it is the kuriwvtaton [being in the strictest sense] (Met. Θ 10, 1051b1), i.e., what is decisive, what leads the way, with respect to gaining access to beings in the mode of a simple perceiving of them and an explicative defining of them. [Ὄν κατὰ συμβεβηκός [being in the sense of accidental attributes], i.e., being in the how of being-found-along-with, is as little constitutive for beings as ὄν ὡς ἀληθές. For the primordial sense of being is being-produced [Hergestelltsein]. Such beings are originally there, as what they are, only for a productive kind of dealings, only that these dealings now no longer make use of them, in that they are able to take up the now finished and ready objects within different and no longer original points of view for caring about them.

The being of a house is being as being-built [Erstelltsein] (οὐσία γενομένη, ποιηθεῖσα [being that is coming into being, is being produced].19 Thus the sense of being is for Aristotle a very particular sense of being, not the vague, indifferent sense of reality in general. Here being is relative to production, i.e., to the circumspection (procedures) illuminating these dealings. As a consequence of this