The general term "being" includes these four basic problems: 1) the ontological difference, 2) the basic articulation of being, 3) the veridical character of being, 4) the regionality of being and the unity of the idea of being.
The being problem has been thus clarified as central, universal, and radical. We gained some insight into what it means, in general, to investigate the intrinsic possibility of there being something like an understanding-of-being, an understanding which is the essential prerogative of human existence. But, in characterizing the commonly understood, on tic transcendence as it occurs in intentionality, we saw that the relationship to beings, the ontic relationship, presupposes an understanding-of-being; we saw that ontic transcendence is itself based on p rimal transcendence, which is thereby related to the understanding-of-being. The structure of this problem has now been shown, and this indicates in retrospect that the problems of transcendence, of truth, of reason [grounds], can only be investigated in the dimension adumbrated by the problem of being in general. In other words, the problem of transcendence must be posed as universally and radically as the problem of being as such. It is, therefore, not a problem that could be restricted to the relation the subject has to things independent of it, and it is not only a question about a certain region of beings. Nor may one stop or start with a subject-object relation, as if it somehow fell from heaven; but for transcendence, as for the problem of being, it is the subjectivity of the subject which is itself the central question.
Three claims may be added here:
1) Beings are in themselves the kinds of beings they are, and in the way they are, even if, for example, Dasein does not exist. 2 ) Being "is" not, but being i s there [es gibt], insofar as Dasein exists. In the essence of existence there is transcendence, i .e., a giving of world prior to and for all being-toward-and-among intra-worldly beings. 3) Only insofar as existing Dasein gives itself anything like being can beings emerge in their in-themselves, i.e., can the first claim likewise be understood at all and be taken into account.
N.B. Because being "is" not, and thus is never along with other beings, there is no proper sense at all or legitimacy in asking what being is with respect to beings in themselves. One could ask, however, what, in beings, corresponds to the being (that is not, but) which is "only" there. Being is there [gibt sich] primordially and in itself, when it gives access to its beings. Nor with regard to these beings can one investigate their being in itself We always know only beings, but never being as a being. This becomes clear from the nature of transcendence and the ontological difference.