Logic
The Question of Truth


Contents


Translator's Forewardix

Introduction

1

§ 1. The first, most literal meaning of the word “logic”

5

§ 2. A first indication of the concept of the subject matter of “logic”

10

§ 3. A philosophizing logic and traditional scholastic logic

15

§4. The possibility and the being of truth in general. Skepticism

20

§ 5. Outline of the course. Bibliography

Prolegomenon.

27

The contemporary situation of philosophical logic.
(Psychologism and the question of truth)

29

§6. Psychologism: the name and the concept

37

§7. Husserl’s critique of psychologism

37

a) Some preliminaries of the critique

39

b) Demonstration of the fundamental errors

45

§ 8. The presuppositions of Husserl’s critique: a specific concept of truth as the guiding idea

52

§ 9. The roots of these presuppositions

74

§10. Anti-critical questions. The need to take the question of the essence of truth back to Aristotle

74

a) Why must the critique of psychologism be a critique of psychology?

82

b) What positive contribution does the phenomenological investigation of psychologism make to the question of the concept and interpretation of the phenomenon of truth?

90

c) The connection between propositional and intuitional truth. The need to return to Aristotle

Part I.

The problem of truth in the decisive origins of philosophical logic, and the seedbed of traditional logic (focused on Aristotle)

107

§ 11. The place of truth, and λόγoς (proposition)

114

§ 12. The basic structure of λόγoς and the phenomenon of making sense

120

a) The as-structure of our primary way of understanding: the hermeneutical “as”

129

b) The modification of the as-structure in the act of determining: the apophantic “as”

136

§ 13. The conditions of the possibility of λόγoς being false. The question of truth

136

a) Preparatory interpretation. Metaphysics IV 7 and VI 4, and De interpretatione 1

143

b) Truth and being. Interpretation of Metaphysics IX 10

154

c) The three conditions for the possibility of a statement being false, taken in their interconnection

161

§ 14. The presupposition for Aristotle’s interpretation of truth as the authentic determination of being

Part II.

The radicalized question: What is truth? (A retrieval of the analysis of falsehood in terms of its ur-temporality)

167

§ 15. The idea of a phenomenological chronology

175

§ 16. The conditions of the possibility of falsehood within the horizon of the analysis of existence

185

§ 17. Care as the being of existence. Concern-for and concern-about, authenticity and inauthenticity

195

§ 18. The ur-temporality of care

203

§ 19. Preparatory considerations toward attaining an original understanding of time. A return to the history of the philosophical interpretation of the concept of time

208

§ 20. Hegel’s interpretation of time in the Encyclopaedia

218

§ 21. The influence of Aristotle on Hegel’s and Bergson’s interpretation of time

224

§ 22. A preliminary look at the meaning of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

226

§ 23. The interpretation of time in the Transcendental Analytic

227

a) An explanation of the notions “form” and “intuition”

235

b) The constitutive moments of ordering

243

c) Form of intuition and formal intuition

246

d) Space and time as given infinite magnitudes; quantum and quantitas in Kant’s interpretation

252

§ 24. The function of time in the Transcendental Logic. A characterization of the problematic

258

§ 25. The question of the unity of nature

264

§ 26. The original a priori of all combining—the transcendental unity of apperception

275

§ 27. Time as the universal a priori form of all appearances

279

§ 28. Time as original pure self-affection

284

§ 29. The question about the connection between time as original self-affection and the “I think”

286

§ 30. Interpretation of the First Analogy of Experience in the light of our interpretation of time

294

§ 31. The schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding

297

a) Sensibilization of appearances

298

b) Sensibilization of empirical sensible concepts

300

c) Sensibilization of pure sensible concepts

301

d) Image and schema

309

e) Sensibilization of the pure concepts of understanding

313

§ 32. Number as the schema of quantity

319

§ 33. Sensation as the schema of reality

323

§ 34. Persistence as the schema of substance

328

§ 35. The time-determination of the synthesis speciosa

330

§ 36. The now-structure that we have attained: its character of referral and of making present. The phenomenal demonstrability and limits of Kant’s interpretation of time

337

§ 37. Time as an existential of human existence—temporality and the structure of care. The statement as a making-present

345

Editor's Afterword

347

Glossaries

355

Abbreviations



Logic (GA 21) [GA App]

Ereignis