History of the Concept of Time


Contents


TRANSLATOR'S FOREWARD

1

Introduction The Theme and Method of the Lecture Course

1

§ 1. Nature and history as domains of objects for the sciences

5

§ 2. Prolegomena to a phenomenology of history and nature under the guidance of the history of the concept of time

7

§ 3. Outline of the lecture course


PRELIMINARY PART

The Sense and Task of Phenomenological Research


Chapter One Emergence and Initial Breakthrough of Phenomenological Research 13

13

§ 4. The situation of philosophy in the second half of the 19th century. Philosophy and the sciences

15

a) The position of positivism

16

b) Neo-Kantianism-the rediscovery of Kant in the philosophy of science

17

c) Critique of positivism-Dilthey's call for an independent method for the human sciences

17

d) The trivializing of Dilthey's inquiry by Windelband and Rickert

18

e) Philosophy as 'scientific philosophy'-psychology as the basic science of philosophy (the theory of consciousness)

19

α) Franz Brentano

23

β) Edmund Husser!


Chapter Two The Fundamental Discoveries of Phenomenology, Its Principle, and the Clarification of Its Name 27

27

§ 5. Intentionality

29

a) Intentionality as the structure of lived experiences: exposition and initial elucidation

32

b) Rickert's misunderstanding of phenomenology and intentionality

36

c) The basic constitution of intentionality as such

37

α) The perceived of perceiving: the entity in itself (environmental thing, natural thing, thinghood)

40

β) The perceived of perceiving: the how of being-intended (the perceivedness of the entity, the feature of bodily-there)

44

γ) Initial indication of the basic mode of intentionality as the belonging-together of intentio and intentum

47

§ 6. Categorial intuition

48

a) Intentional presuming and intentional fulfillment

48

α) Identification as demonstrative fulfillment

50

β) Evidence as identifying fulfillment

51

γ) Truth as demonstrative identification

53

δ) Truth and being

55

b) Intuition and expression

56

α) Expression of perceptions

60

β) Simple and multi-level acts

63

c) Acts of synthesis

66

d) Acts of ideation

68

α) Averting misunderstandings

71

β) The significance of this discovery

72

§ 7. The original sense of the apriori

75

§ 8. The principle of phenomenology

75

a) The meaning of the maxim "to the matters themselves"

79

b) Phenomenology's understanding of itself as analytic description of intentionality in its apriori

80

§ 9. Clarification of the name 'phenomenology'

80

a) Clarification of the original sense of the component parts of the name

81

α) The original sense of φαίνομενον

84

β) Original sense of λόγος (λόγος ἀποφαντικός and λόγος σημαντικός)

85

b) Definition of the unified meaning thus obtained and the research corresponding to it

88

c) Correcting a few typical misunderstandings of phenomenology which stem from its name



Chapter Three The Early Development of Phenomenological Research and the Necessity of a Radical Reflection in and from Itself 90

91

§ 10. Elaboration of the thematic field: the fundamental determination of intentionality

91

a) Explication of the demarcation of the thematic field of phenomenology and fixation of the working horizons in Husserl and Scheler

94

b) Fundamental reflection upon the regional structure of the field in its originality: elaboration of pure consciousness as an independent region of being

102

§ 11. Immanent critique of phenomenological research: critical discussion of the four determinations of pure consciousness

103

a) Consciousness is immanent being

104

b) Consciousness is absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness

104

c) Consciousness is absolutely given in the sense of 'nulla re indiget ad existendum'

106

d) Consciousness is pure being

108

§ 12. Exposition of the neglect of the question of the being of the intentional as the basic field of phenomenological research

114

§ 13. Exposition of the neglect of the question of the sense of being itself and of the being of man in phenomenology

115

a) The necessary demarcation of phenomenology from naturalistic psychology, and its overcoming

116

b) Dilthey's endeavor of a 'personalistic psychology'-his idea of man as a person

119

c) Husserl's adoption of the personalistic tendency in the "Logos-Essay"

123

d) Fundamental critique of personalistic psychology on a phenomenological basis

126

e) Scheler's unsuccessful attempt in determining the mode of the being of acts and of the performer of acts

128

f) Result of the critical reflection: the neglect of the question of being as such and of the being of the intentional is grounded in the fallen ness of Dasein itself


MAIN PART

Analysis of the Phenomenon of Time and Derivation of the Concept of Time


FIRST DIVISION

Preparatory Description of the Field in Which the Phenomenon of Time Becomes Manifest


Chapter One The Phenomenology That Is Grounded in the Question of Being 135

135

§ 14. Exposition of the question of being from the radically understood sense of the phenomenological principle

138

a) Assumption of the tradition as a genuine repetition

139

b)

140

c)


Chapter Two Elaboration of the Question of Being in Terms of an Initial Explication of Dasein 143

143

§ 15. Emergence of the question of being from an indeterminate preunderstanding of Dasein-question of being and understanding of being

144

§ 16. Interrogative structure of the question of being

147

§ 17. Correlation of the question of being and the questioning entity (Dasein)


Chapter Three The Most Immediate Explication of Dasein Starting from its Everydayness. The Basic Constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-World 151

152

§ 18. Acquisition of the fundamental structures of the basic constitution of Dasein

152

a) The Dasein is in the 'to be it at its time'

154

b) The Dasein in the 'to be' of everydayness for its particular while

156

§ 19. The basic constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. The in-being of Dasein and the being-in of things on hand

160

§ 20. Knowing as a derivative mode of the in-being of Dasein

167

§ 21. Worldhood of the world

167

a) World hood as the wherein for Dasein's leeway of encounter

170

b) World hood of the environing world: aroundness, the primary character of the space of the "around" as constitutive of world hood

171

§ 22. How the tradition passed over the question of the worldhood of the world. Descartes as an example

185

§ 23. Positive exposition of the basic structure of the worldhood of the world

186

a) Analysis of the characters of encounter of the world (reference, referential totality, familiarity, 'one')

189

b) Interpretation of the structure of encounter of the environing world: the phenomenal correlation founding the characters of encounter themselves

191

α) The work-world: more detailed phenomenological interpretation of the environing world of concern

193

β) Characterization of the specific function of encounter of this work-world for encountering the nearest things in the environing world- the specific character of reality of the handy

198

γ) The specific function of encounter of the work-world for letting us encounter that which is always already therethe extant on hand

200

c) Determination of the basic structure of world hood as meaningfulness

200

α) Misinterpretation of the phenomenon of reference as substance and function

201

β) Sense of the structure of encounter belonging to world as meaningfulness

204

γ) Interconnection of the phenomena of meaningfulness, sign, reference, and relation

209

δ) Being-in-the-world, as concerned and understanding, discloses the world as meaningfulness

214

§ 24. Internal structuring of the question of the reality of the external world

214

a) The reality of the external world is exempt from any proof of it or belief in it

216

b) The reality of the real (worldhood of the world) cannot be defined on the basis of its being an object and being apprehended

218

c) Reality is not interpreted by way of the in-itself; rather, this character is itself in need of interpretation

219

d) Reality is not to be understood primarily in terms of the bodily presence of the perceived

220

e) Reality is not adequately clarified by the phenomenon of resistance as the object of drive and effort

223

§ 25. Spatiality of the world

225

a) Highlighting of the phenomenal structure of around ness as such is constituted by: remotion, region, orientation (directionality)

227

b) The primary spatiality of Dasein itself: remotion, region, orientation are determinations of the being of Dasein as being-in-the-world

234

c) Spatializing the environing world and its space-space and extension in mathematical determination using Leibniz as an example

236

§ 26. The 'who' of being-in-the-world

237

a) Dasein as being-with-the being of others as co-Dasein (critique of the thematic of empathy)

243

b) The Anyone as the who of the being of with-one-another in everydayness


Chapter Four A More Original Explication of In-Being: The Being of Dasein as Care 251

251

§ 27. In-being and care-an outline

252

§ 28. The phenomenon of discoveredness

252

a) Structure of the discovered ness of Dasein in its world: disposition

257

b) Understanding: the enactment of the being of discoveredness

260

c) The cultivation of understanding in interpretation

261

d) Discourse and language

265

α) Discoursing and hearing

267

β) Discoursing and silence

269

γ) Discoursing and idle talk

270

δ) Discourse and language

272

§ 29. Falling as a basic movement of Dasein

272

a) Idle talk

274

b) Curiosity

278

c) Ambiguity

281

d) The characters of the inherent movement of falling

282

e) The fundamental structures of Dasein from the horizon of fallenness

283

§ 30. The structure of uncanniness

283

a) The phenomenon of flight and fear

284

α) Fear as being afraid of something considered in its four essential moments

287

β) The modifications of fear

288

γ) Fear in the sense of fearing about

289

b) Dread and uncanniness

292

c) More original explication of falling and dread (uncanniness) as a preview of the basic constitution of Dasein as care

293

§ 31. Care as the being of Dasein

293

a) Determination of the articulated structure of care

295

b) The phenomena of urge and propensity

297

c) Care and discoveredness

299

d) Care and the character of the 'before' in understanding and interpretation (prepossession, preview, preconception)

301

e) The 'Fable of Cura' as an illustration of an original self-nterpretation of Dasein

303

f) Care and intentionality


SECOND DIVISION

The Exposition of Time Itself


305

§ 32. The result and the task of the fundamental analysis of Dasein: elaboration of the question of being itself

307

§ 33. Necessity for the thematic development of the phenomenological interpretation of Dasein as a whole. The phenomenon of death

312

§ 34. Phenomenological interpretation of death as a phenomenon of Dasein

315

a) The utmost possibility of death in the mode of being of everydayness

317

b) The authentic relationship of the being of Dasein toward death

318

§ 35. The phenomenon of willing to have a conscience and of being guilty

319

§ 36. Time as the being in which Dasein can be its totality


321

EDITOR'S EPILOGUE

325

GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS





History of the Concept of Time (GA 20) [GA App]

Ereignis