§30. Uncanniness [402-403]]

not as this definite fact but in its facticity. Dread is nothing but the disposition to uncanniness.

The of-which and the about-which of dread are both Dasein itself, more accurately, the fact that I am, that is, "I am" in the sense of the naked being-in-the-world. This naked factuality is not that of being on hand like a thing, but the kind of being which is constitutive of finding oneself [in a situation].

Dasein is 'on hand' in a radical sense, in the sense of facticity. It does not find itself solely as something on hand in the sense of the ground and foundation, that it is. Rather, the ground is an existential ground, which means a disclosed ground—and a "bottomless ground," an abyss at that. This is the existential positivity of the nothing of dread. Facticity as a constituent of existence is not grafted onto something on hand, and man is not existence as the union of an extant soul and an extant body. In other words, existence rightly understood is not the union of the separated, but the original kind of being which defines this entity ontologically.

Dasein is such that it is this peculiar factic dimension; in short, Dasein is its very facticity. The 'fact' that Dasein 'is' at all and 'is not not' is not a mere property in it, but can be experienced by Dasein itself in an original experience; this is nothing but the disposition of dread. Facticity of Dasein means: It is in a manner of its being this being, that it is; more accurately: It is its very 'there' and 'in.'

In dread world hood as such presents itself together with my being in it, without bringing any definite datum to the foreground. Earlier, in analyzing Descartes's concept of the subject, I referred to his statement that we actually have no affection of being as such. But there is such an affection (if one wants to use this mode of expression). Dread is nothing other than the pure and simple experience of being in the sense of being-in-the-world. This experience can, though it does not have to-just as all possibilities of being come under a 'can'—assume a distinctive sense in death or, more precisely, in dying. We then speak of the dread of death, which must be kept altogether distinct from the fear of death, for it is not fear in the face of death but dread as a disposition to the naked being-in-the-world, to pure Dasein. There is thus the possibility, in the very moment of departing from the world, so to speak, when the world has nothing more to say to us and every other has nothing more to say, that the world and our being-in-it show themselves purely and simply.

This analysis of dread depicts a phenomenon which in its nature simply cannot be forced and whose analysis here also has nothing whatsoever to do with any sort of sentimentality. The analysis has exhibited this phenomenon of dread as the foundation in being for Dasein's flight from itself.