284
More Original Explication of Dasein [392-393]

that from which flight flees must be made manifest in that of which fear is afraid. The mode of being of fleeing must be explicated by way of the mode of being of fear, or the structures of being which themselves lie in fear. So in order to phenomenologically grasp this phenomenon of the flight of Dasein from itself, it is first necessary to explicate the phenomenon of fear.

In doing so, we must bear in mind that the phenomenon of fear is a way of being toward the world, and that fearing is always a fearing related to world or to co-Dasein. To the extent that the phenomenon of fear has been investigated, it is in fact always taken in this way, and all the different modifications of fear are defined on the basis of this being afraid of something within the world. But we have already stated that the flight of Dasein in falling is a flight of Dasein from itself, and so not a· flight from the world and from a particular thing of the world. If it is true that Dasein flees from itself, then the fear which founds this flight cannot, strictly speaking, actually be fear, inasmuch as fear is always a mode of being which is essentially related to something worldly. In other words, it will become apparent that the traditional analysis of the phenomenon of fear is in principle insufficient, that fear is a derivative phenomenon and is itself grounded in the phenomenon which we call dread.

Dread is not a mode of fear. Rather, it is the other way around: All fear finds its ground in dread. To facilitate our phenomenological apprehension, our consideration will start with fear and then go back to the phenomenon of dread. We shall consider five points: 1) fear as being afraid of something, 2) the modification of the being of fear, 3) fear in the sense of fearing about and fearing for another, 4) dread, and 5) uncanniness.

α) Fear as being afraid of something considered in its
four essential moments

This phenomenon was first investigated by Aristotle in the context of an analysis of the passions, the πάθη, in his Rhetoric.1 The analysis of fear which Aristotle presents here as well as his analysis of the emotions generally serve to define the interpretation of the Stoics and so that of Augustine and the middle ages. Then, in the revival of the Stoic doctrine of the emotions in the Renaissance, this entire complex of analyses of the emotional was introduced into modern philosophy, which is where things have remained. Kant, for example, operates almost without exception within these ancient definitions. Of course, we cannot go into these historical connections here, especially since they offer nothing essentially new when compared to Aristotle, except that


1. Aristotle. Rhetoric B5. 1382a20-1383b11.