§73 [483-84]

What is originary and primary is, and constantly remains, the full undifferenti­ated manifold out of which, from time to time and in particular cases and discursive tendencies of the assertion, only one meaning or one predominant meaning is referred to. The originary yet unarticulated and unaccentuated multiplicity of what being already means in advance in each case becomes a particular meaning via limitation, whereby the whole multiplicity that is al­ready inter alia understood is not eliminated, but precisely also posited. To the extent that a concept of being is achieved, it begins in one or more of these meanings. Limitation is always subsequent to the originary whole. For now, we may only assess the implications of this insight into the multiformity of the essence of the copula in one particular direction—a direction that im­mediately leads us back into the guiding problem that we had meanwhile suspended.

§73. Return to the ground of the possibility
of the structure of assertion as a whole.

a) Indication of the connection between our inquiring
back and the guiding problem of world.

I shall briefly outline once more the way in which we have thus far unfolded the problem of world. World is the manifestness of beings as such as a whole. We are asking concerning the 'as' in order to penetrate from there into the phe­nomenon of world. The 'as' is something distinctive about that which human Dasein is open for, in contrast to the animal's being open for ... In the case of the animal, being open for ... is being taken by ... in captivation. This 'as' belongs to a relating. The kind of relation and its dimension are obscure. However, the 'as' is after all connected to the assertion. Accordingly, we at­tempted to elucidate, by providing an interpretation of such assertion, how the 'as' belongs to the structure of assertion. Our interpretation of the assertion with respect to Aristotle revealed that all essential structures—κατάφασις, ἀπόφασις, ἀληθεύειν, ψεύδεσθαι—are traced back to σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις. This enigmatic collection of mutually exclusive kinds of relating remained obscure and enigmatic for us. Presumably the relation belonging to the 'as' is to be found here. As well as κατάφασις and ἀπόφασις, however, the assertion is equally always an assertion about ..., λόγος τινός (Plato). What ἀπόφανσις as a form relates to is beings. Their being appears in a multiplicity of discursive forms in the assertion, as expressed by the 'is'. Ac­cording to Aristotle, we likewise find a σύνθεσις here. 'Being' and its multi­plicity, as well as the 'as', are accordingly also grounded in this enigmatic σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις. Or, to put it more cautiously, 'being' and the 'as'

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