Scholar: Not occasionally;, but—how shall we say it—prior to everything.

Scientist: The prior, of which we really can not think . . .

Teacher: . . . because the nature of thinking begins there.

Scientist: Thus man's nature is released to that-which-regions in what is prior to thought.

Scholar: Which is why we also added at once: and, indeed, through that-which-regions itself.

Teacher: It appropriates man's nature for its own regioning.

Scientist: So we have explained releasement. Nevertheless we have neglected to consider*—something that struck me at once—why man's nature is appropriated by that-which-regions.

Scholar: Evidently the nature of man is released to that-which-regions because this belongs to it so essentially, that without man that-which-regions can not be a coming forth of all natures, as it is.

Scientist: This is hardly conceivable.

Teacher: It cannot be conceived at all so long as we want to re-present it to ourselves, that is, forcibly bring before ourselves an objectively given relation between an object called "man" and an object called "that-which-regions."

Scientist: That may be so. But even if we are mindful of that, doesn't there remain an insurmountable difficulty in the statement of the essential relation of human nature to that-which-regions? We have just characterized that-which-regions as the hidden nature of truth. If to be brief we say truth in place of that-which-regions, then the statement of the relation of human nature to